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ABSTRACT
The institutions that comprise the United States intelligence community have
organizational cultures that are unique from other government agencies. These cultures
encourage the development and retention of traits that are necessary to mission
accomplishment, yet these exclusivities also hamstring organizations and contribute to
significant security failures. This thesis isolates elements of organizational culture
specific to the United States intelligence community and explores the extent to which
the culture is responsible for security and/or counterintelligence shortcomings.
For this thesis, the author selected three governmental organizations with
intelligence collection and analysis functions: Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI),
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The use
of these agencies demonstrates that the intelligence community’s military (ONI),
intelligence (CIA), and law enforcement (FBI) components share common
organizational traits.
The author subsequently identified a significant security failure case
encountered by each agency and employed a case study approach to determine the
extent to which organizational culture contributed to the security failures. Internal
agency investigations and external assessments of espionage activities reveal that
cultural factors impede the early detection of security compromises and thwart law
enforcement efforts to investigate suspicious behavior.
Despite the deleterious effects of national security collapses, the intelligence
community’s personnel increasingly recognize the complicity of organizational culture
in such security failures.

The intelligence community increasingly analyzes the

vi

negative aspects of its organizational traits, and there have been substantive strides
within the intelligence establishment to minimize the security obstacles that
organizational culture imposes on its constituent adherents.
The intelligence apparatus must maintain an organizational culture that
distinguishes it from other government agencies.

Unfortunately, the community’s

cultural characteristics also convey increased risks of security compromises.

It is

possible, however, for the United States intelligence community to maintain its unique
organizational culture and minimize the possibility of operational or security failure.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Organizations tasked with the collection and analysis of intelligence share
cultural characteristics that distinguish them from most private sector groups and other
governmental agencies that do not deal with intelligence matters regularly. Although
certain cultural characteristics are as much a part of foreign (non-United States)
intelligence agencies as they are central to the United States intelligence community,
this thesis will concentrate on cultural concepts and the role they play in select United
States intelligence agencies.
The organizational culture of the United States intelligence community allows
the establishment to achieve operational objectives, but the same culture also
contributes to security failures that continually plague the United States intelligence
apparatus. Among the organizational culture characteristics that are specific to the
intelligence community is the assumption that intelligence organizations will attract and
employ individuals whose personalities, ideologies, and motivations are dissimilar from
those of other government and private sector employees. Diverse value systems are
also critical to the intelligence function, yet the necessity of divergent value systems
poses significant risks to the security of intelligence functions.

The intelligence

community also stresses concepts such as limited information disclosure, extensive
compartmentation policies, and routine counterintelligence protocols that border on
paranoia. Other cultural attributes of the intelligence community include the degree of
pre- and post-employment screening and security measures to which intelligence
employees are subject. There are also numerous personal, public, and institutional

1

factors that contribute to and complicate the intelligence community’s unique
organizational culture.
It is extremely important for intelligence professionals to be aware of those
cultural traits that are specific to the intelligence community because it is possible for
individuals to act in accordance with those organizational culture principles while
minimizing the possibility of security lapses due to exaggerations, abuses, and neglect
of the intelligence culture’s attributes.

This awareness is exceptionally vital to

intelligence managers and counterintelligence professionals who must proactively
balance cultural necessities with the security weaknesses that organizational culture
may exacerbate.
In its simplest form, organizational culture refers to the norms, values, and
expectations that influence and govern the manner in which groups (or agencies)
prioritize objectives and conduct their affairs. Culture also establishes acceptability
parameters for behavior within a given body and details the consequences or results of
nonconformance with underlying assumptions. Organizational culture is basically a
theoretical explanation for the means by which an organization accomplishes its
objectives (Schein 7). Contrary to common beliefs, intelligence refers to more than
mere information. Information develops into intelligence when contextual analysis by
persons or equipment capable of interpreting its relation to other information determines
that it is of substantive value. Information becomes intelligence when the organizations
that employ it in the decision-making process attach worth to it. Mark Lowenthal
accurately notes that “[a]ll intelligence is information; not all information is
intelligence” (Lowenthal 2).
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In practically every organization, there exist belief systems, expectations,
understandings, and concepts that affect the efficiency of the organization as well as the
means by which groups and the individuals that comprise them attempt to accomplish
given goals and priorities. Within organizations, there are also value systems at play
that allow (and occasionally compel) employees to evaluate group dynamics and
determine whether individual values and belief systems are compatible with or contrary
to those exhibited by the organization or groups that comprise it. The combination of
individual and community value systems with supervisory guidance/directive helps to
define a system of norms and expectations specific to a given organization. The culture
of the organization affects all aspects of its operation, including productivity, efficiency,
and employee morale.

Within those agencies that comprise the United States

intelligence community (IC), however, organizational culture factors are more complex
than in many organizations and impact far more than profitability.
The agencies, departments, and bureaus that comprise the United States
intelligence community differ greatly from other governmental organizations due to
their unique missions, methodologies, and organizational cultures. The organizational
personalities that evolve in intelligence establishment entities are unavoidably necessary
to the organizations’ abilities to accomplish assigned objectives. However, the very
characteristics that contribute to the intelligence community’s unique organizational
culture may also impede its ability to protect itself from security compromises and those
who threaten operational security by disclosing classified information for ideological,
monetary, or other reasons.
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Given the nature of intelligence operations as well as the collection and
analytical activities associated with such functions, it is not surprising that the risks
affiliated with intelligence actions occasionally result in operational failures, security
breaches, or counterintelligence shortcomings. Many intelligence functions face
increased risks of operational compromise because of the intelligence community’s
reliance on sources and methodology that are susceptible to detection by its subjects’
counterintelligence measures. In addition, many intelligence organizations encounter
operational constraints that, although imposed by the agency sponsoring the collection
and analytical activities, hamstring the organizations and ultimately prevent the
intelligence

agencies

from

detecting

security

breaches

and

identifying

counterintelligence threats. In fact, the intelligence institution itself may be its own
worst enemy in terms of security concerns by virtue of the operational attributes it
embodies and the organizational culture it fosters among its members.
The purpose and mission of the United States intelligence community
necessitate recruitment of employees whose belief and value systems vary widely. A
diverse workforce combats homogenous assumptions and expectations that may result
when groups lack diversity of values and beliefs. The extent to which employee value
systems are consistent with or opposed to cultural expectations in intelligence
organizations impacts mission accomplishment, employee morale, operational security,
and counterintelligence efforts to detect security risks.

The Pollard and Ames

espionage cases confirm that poor employee morale may result in disenfranchisement
with an agency’s intelligence purpose and lead to operational security and
counterintelligence shortcomings based on inaccurate predictions of employee behavior.
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Furthermore, due to their responsibilities and the sometimes secretive manner in which
they perform many assigned objectives, intelligence organizations have developed an
organizational culture that requires and encourages secrecy, limited information
sharing, and deep-seated suspicions of other agencies within the intelligence
community. Naturally, intelligence professionals are even more suspicious of their
peers who represent other states’ intelligence and national security interests.
Military, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies of the United States that
collect intelligence clandestinely and analyze classified as well as open-source
information are the regular targets of other actors’ intelligence establishments.
Intelligence officers, analysts, and agents routinely engage in high-stakes cat-andmouse analyses that draw on game theory principles.

Intelligence professionals

regularly analyze their collection actions and intelligence analyses in the context of
“what-if” scenarios that allow them to consider as many possible consequences of their
efforts and assessments. The extent to which their operations are successful depends on
the agencies’ insistence that employees adhere to cultural traits specific to the
intelligence community.

Naturally, operational success also hinges on opposing

counterintelligence corps’ detection techniques and the conduct of their own
intelligence assets.

However, even the most capable professionals and exemplary

operations the United States has to offer are subject to increased failure risks due to
internal security breaches and failed counterintelligence operations. The intelligence
community’s unique organizational culture contributes directly to its ability to sustain
operational success and detect threats that could jeopardize intelligence operations.
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One of the best-known icons of the United States intelligence community is the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its headquarters facility located just outside
Washington, D.C., in Langley, Virginia.

The CIA’s high profile may lead those who

are unfamiliar with the intelligence community to assume that all intelligence
operations involve the Agency’s clandestine collection officers.

In actuality, the

intelligence community consists of at least thirteen agencies within the military, civilian
intelligence, and law enforcement apparatuses.
Each of the Defense Department’s military branches includes occupational
specialties that are categorized broadly as “military intelligence.” The United States
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps employ civilians and armed service
members whose duties include intelligence, counterintelligence, and physical and
technical security functions. The force strengths within each branch vary internally, but
comparatively, the intelligence assets of the Army and Navy exceed the resources
allocated to the Air Force and Marine Corps (“Agencies”).

The armed forces

intelligence components differ markedly from their civilian and law enforcement
counterparts.
The military intelligence corps focuses, appropriately, on force protection issues,
specifically the collection and analysis of intelligence that impacts or threatens the
armed force operations of the United States and, increasingly, its allies.

Military

intelligence resources also respond to tasking from civilian intelligence agencies for
specific collection requirements and perform extensive foreign language translation and
interpretation duties of communications and signals intelligence collected by the
National Security Agency.

The branches also are responsible for other security
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functions such as initial and periodic background investigations of service members
whose positions necessitate access to classified information. To demonstrate that the
cultural characteristics exhibited by civilian intelligence agencies are also commonplace
in the military intelligence establishment, this study will include a review of the
espionage activities of Jonathan Jay Pollard during his employment with the United
States Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the ONI’s inability to identify the threat
Pollard posed. The case study demonstrates that cultural traits expected of the CIA are
inherent in other intelligence institutions as well, including the defense components.
As indicated by its title, the Central Intelligence Agency is by far the most
renowned intelligence agency in the United States intelligence community;
“intelligence” is in fact generally a synonym of the CIA acronym (Lowenthal 67). The
National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA’s predecessor, the Office of Strategic
Services (NARA “Records”). The United States Congress enacted the 1947 legislation
for two reasons. The public and its elected representatives sought to prevent another
national security disaster such as the Pearl Harbor tragedy of December 7, 1941.
According to many post-attack assessments, the United States could have prevented the
Japanese attack on Hawaii if better information-sharing practices had occurred between
military leaders and civilian intelligence professionals (Hitz 2). The National Security
Act therefore sought to establish an information clearinghouse for national intelligence
assembly and analysis with the expectation that improved communications and
information sharing would diminish if not eliminate security failures due to inadequate
communication channels (Hitz 2-3).
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The OSS was the subject of severe criticism during its organizational infancy
based on the agency’s role in the Phoenix program during the Vietnam conflict. The
Phoenix program was the OSS’s controversial attempt to disrupt programmatically the
rural apparatus that supported the Vietcong’s need for soldiers and logistics by
neutralizing Vietcong supporters and their bases in Vietnam and Cambodia (Karnow
616). The OSS eventually developed into the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
current organizational structure divides the agency’s functions among four directorates.
The Directorate of Administration and Training manages personnel matters to
include employee hiring, training, transfers, payroll processing, and benefits
administration. The Directorate of Science and Technology is responsible for technical
analysis of photographic, satellite, and other imagery provided by agencies such as the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The Directorate of Operations (DO), or the
clandestine service, is the arm of the CIA tasked with the overseas collection of
political, military, economic, social, and other information relevant to the development
and implementation of the United States’s domestic and international policy agendas.
The DO collects for analysis information that would not be available through overt
channels. The Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI) performs all-source analysis of
classified and unclassified information obtained by the DO and other intelligence
agencies. The DI’s analyses also influence domestic and foreign policy decisions made
by members of the executive and legislative branches of government.
Each CIA directorate has its own agenda, and each division also has its own
cultural traits. Throughout this thesis, reference to the CIA’s organizational culture(s)
will refer to the Directorate of Operations and Directorate of Intelligence because these
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directorates best exemplify the cultural characteristics that contribute to security failures
within the United States intelligence community.

Analysis reveals organizational

culture factors influence significantly the CIA’s ability to detect and address security
threats. The case study of the Aldrich Hazen Ames espionage affair demonstrates this
fact dramatically. The review also highlights the stark divide between intelligence
agencies and law enforcement agencies over the role of intelligence and the
consequences of that philosophical difference on agencies’ proactive security measures.
Unlike intelligence organizations, law enforcement agencies exist to investigate
and enforce violations of various criminal statutes. To accomplish this mission, most
law enforcement agencies receive investigative support from intelligence research
specialists (or analysts) within intelligence divisions, departments, or groups. Whereas
the CIA bears the responsibility for overseas collection requirements and may not
collect information domestically, law enforcement agencies and the intelligence arms
that support them must focus primarily on domestic concerns.

Nonetheless, the

investigative reality is that many law enforcement agencies, particularly the United
States Customs Service (USCS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have the authority and need to pursue international leads
in connection with complex criminal investigations.

These agencies’ exposure to

international actors necessitates high levels of support from internal intelligence assets
and formal liaisons with external resources to conduct thorough investigations. The
case study of the espionage activities of FBI special agent Robert Philip Hanssen
demonstrates that differences in intelligence and law enforcement ideology are
surmountable. The study also indicates that when they are faced with security concerns,
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law enforcement and intelligence agencies may be mutually dependent on each other to
determine the source(s) of security failures and prevent unauthorized information
disclosure or compromise.
The case studies of Pollard, Ames, and Hanssen capture dramatically the
consequences of agencies’ failures to detect or otherwise prevent security compromises
that ended lives and jeopardized operations. The following chapters discuss the extent
to which the intelligence community’s organizational culture retains responsibility for
those failures.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Organizational culture is more than a label or construct used to explain group
behavior.

In fact, culture is a phenomenon that occurs when a combination of

characteristics assembles and creates a guidance system that influences both individual
and group behaviors. This thesis will employ the description of organizational culture
provided by Edgar H. Schein, who, in Organizational Culture and Leadership, defines
culture as
a pattern of basic assumptions—invented, discovered, or developed by a
given group as it learns to cope with its problem of external adaptation
and internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered
valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems. (9)
Of particular relevance to the intelligence community is the reference in Schein’s
definition to external and internal difficulties. The intelligence culture, for example,
requires internal integration of ideals, but procedural, ideological, and territorial rifts
occur between intelligence community members when they must collaborate or apply a
feasible internal mechanism externally.
Schein further describes various elements that explain culture in greater detail.
He claims the levels of culture include basic underlying assumptions, values, and
artifacts of the organization (13-14). Basic assumptions are the ideas and approaches
that have been implemented so frequently as to become taken for granted. Basic
assumptions represent the thought and action processes from which there is no variation
or deviation since members of a given group or organization “would find behavior
based on any other premise inconceivable” (18). These assumptions are similarly
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described as “’theories-in-use’” or those nondebatable assumptions that guide behavior
and instruct group members on how to think and feel about things (Schein 18).
The nondebatable assumptions of the intelligence culture include a workforce
whose honesty and integrity are beyond reproach, employee screening (to include initial
and periodic background investigations), compartmentation, need-to-know access
principles, and guarded information sharing.

A more detailed discussion of these

assumptions will demonstrate that the basic underlying assumptions of the United States
intelligence community and the role we expect it and, by extension, its participants or
employees to play in the conduct of intelligence affairs represent the least significant
threat to operational security.
Although some criticize what they consider a culture of secrecy, the public
generally understands that the collection and analysis of intelligence demands that
employees and institutions adhere to principles of secrecy and limited disclosure.
Intelligence professionals, too, are generally cognizant that the manner in which the
intelligence business gets done requires a mindset that appreciates the need for
compartmentation and elaborate protocols for information access. Naturally, there are
advocates who urge full disclosure of intelligence’s operational funding, sources, and
methodology, but such demands will not occur since they would undermine intelligence
functions and could jeopardize the lives of individuals in the intelligence community.
Difficulties arise, however, when the basic underlying assumptions of the intelligence
community’s culture become internalized excessively and restrict agencies’ external
adaptation abilities.
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For example, intelligence organizations typically stress the need to protect the
secrecy of operational details. Agencies safeguard such information in a number of
ways, including pre- and post-employment briefings and physical as well as technical
security measures. Occasionally, however, situations arise which expand the circle of
those persons and entities with a need to know operational information. Unfortunately,
intelligence agencies’ prolonged practices of compartmentation and minimizing
information circulation make expanding the need-to-know pool a difficult process. The
task becomes increasingly complicated when the adaptation becomes externalized, or
when one intelligence agency must (or at least should) share information with another
organization that embodies the same culture. In such cases, even the basic underlying
assumptions about the intelligence community, its purposes, and its protocols become
clouded and contribute to its occasional inability to prevent or detect security failures.
The second level of culture addresses an organization’s value systems. Unlike
basic underlying assumptions, values are not universally autonomous responses or
expectations. Values involve beliefs about what organizations should do rather than
what they are expected to do based on cultural assumptions.

Values stress the

importance of prioritization and introduce the element of individualism to
organizational culture.

Although values may eventually become part of an

organization’s basic assumptions, whether this occurs depends on many factors,
including leadership personalities, employee perceptions, and the success of previous
value-driven approaches to problem solving. Among the intelligence community’s
most prominent value issues are degrees of information disclosure, importance of
monetary gain, and significance of the intelligence mission.
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When a value becomes an approach and the approach proves successful (or
becomes socially validated), the value begins what Schein labels “cognitive
transformation,” a process in which values may become synonymous with or part of the
basic assumptions of an organization (16).

Clearly, not all values complete this

transformation process successfully as values are intrinsically linked to individual
beliefs and preferences that are not always malleable. Due to their individuality, values
are exceptionally problematic to the intelligence community, and among the three levels
of culture, they represent the most severe threat to security because of their
unpredictable and influential nature. Whereas the first two levels of culture are fluid
and intangible, the final cultural level consists of identifiable manifestations of an
organization’s underlying assumptions and value systems.
Schein labels the third cultural level as “artifacts,” or the “constructed physical
and social environment” of an organization (14). Artifacts include physical constructs,
language patterns, and other outward expressions based on the other cultural elements.
Among the artifacts specific to the United States intelligence community are physical
and technical security measures, employee screening and disclosure requirements, and
periodic reinvestigations of employees and their families. As the most overt and only
visible element of the intelligence community’s organizational culture, artifacts
represent efficient tools that the intelligence establishment may use to address the threat
posed by the other cultural elements, especially values. Essentially, the elements of
culture as defined by Schein create an internalized system of checks and balances where
divergent values, with the help of a culture’s artifacts, prevent homogenization of
assumptions that could create a bland organizational identity. As the following case
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studies will demonstrate, however, individual values frequently usurp cultural artifacts
and result in security failures.
Michael A. Turner echoes Schein and points out that organizational cultures are
generally positive traits that occur when groups seek to define themselves and protect
themselves from external environments or threats.

Further cultural development

typically ensues thereafter in an effort to maximize efficiency and organizational
effectiveness, especially among subcultures (Turner 261-62). Turner’s latter point is an
especially accurate description of the DI : DO subculture dichotomy in the CIA.
However, if the values of group members are contrary to the values of managerial
personnel or the majority of the organization, the value difference may fail to optimize
efficiency and result in what Schein considers a “socialization failure” that weakens a
generally positive cultural apparatus (42). As demonstrated by the case studies that
follow, if employee value systems “run counter to the pivotal assumptions of the total
organization or the managerial coalition that is in power, the result can be active
sabotage” (Schein 42). Undercutting these complications are individual motivations to
pursue careers in intelligence and the dilemmas employees face after they enter the
field.
Public service careers are not characterized by earnings potentials that are
parallel to employee motivation and ability. Rather, civil service positions typically pay
less than their private sector counterparts, have limited promotion potential, and
compensate employees according to a regimented scale with little (if any) regard for
individual creativity and productivity. In the 1960s, President Kennedy’s call to “’ask
what you can do for your country’” spurred commitments to national idealism and
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swelled governmental ranks (qtd. in Hitz 15), but the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and increased economic opportunities outside government service have lessened interest
in public service careers. This description begs the question of what compels one to
seek a career in public service, much less within a discipline with an organizational
culture as complex as that of the intelligence community. The explanations are diverse
and grounded in the theories of the humanist sociologist Abraham Maslow.
In 1943 Abraham Maslow published “A Theory of Human Motivation” and
challenged long-standing beliefs that promoted the scientific management principles of
Max Weber and Frederick Taylor. Whereas the Weberian approach to management
emphasized concepts such as formal hierarchies and divisions of labor to increase and
maintain productivity, Maslow suggested that humans seek to satisfy a hierarchy of
needs that guide their behavior (Rosenbloom 144, 162). Satisfaction of these needs,
Maslow argued, influenced employee behavior more than the rigid structure of
authoritarianism touted by advocates of scientific management principles.
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs included physiological, safety, social, self-esteem,
and self-actualization needs (Rosenbloom 162). He argued that humans would first
seek to satisfy physiological needs such as hunger and thirst before attempting to fulfill
safety needs (such as shelter). Once workers satisfy these basic needs, they then seek
social interaction that generally leads to increased self-esteem as a result of social
identification with family and peer groups. It is only possible for one to achieve selfactualization (or true fulfillment) after having satisfied the basic predecessor needs.
Despite comparatively lower salaries than private sector employment, public
service careers generally allow needs fulfillment along the Maslowian model. Career
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public servants generally have more stable employment situations than nongovernmental employees, and this stability tends to offer immediate satisfaction of
physiological and safety needs. Civil servants may then address social and self-esteem
needs since the organizations of which they are a part are generally less competitive and
usually comprised of peers with similar interests. Satisfaction of the basic as well as
social needs allows the public servant to achieve self-actualization through work-related
responsibilities as well as functions not related to employment. In addition to these
benefits, public service careers in the intelligence profession generally offer the added
bonus of simultaneous needs fulfillment.
Intelligence professionals not only enjoy the same employment stability and
benefits packages of other government employees, but they also tend to achieve selfactualization in concert with satisfaction of lower level needs. Intelligence careers tend
to attract idealists who migrate towards careers that offer intrigue, prestige, a sense of
accomplishment (or self-actualization), and peer recognition. A career in intelligence
must provide such non-remunerative rewards since there are few occasions when
employees may receive public praise for their efforts. In Organizational Psychology,
Bernard M. Bass and Edward C. Ryterband discuss the importance of these and other
employee motivation principles in their condensation of Maslow’s needs theory into
three broader periods of employee development whose characteristics are especially
relevant to organizational culture principles. Their analysis is particularly important
since the principles they address describe the reality of the intelligence culture as well
as the obstacles such individual psychological factors represent to the intelligence
community.
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According to Bass and Ryterband, the key to employee motivation is “making
the work itself more meaningful to the ego ideals of the employee” (41). The authors
argue that other employment factors such as “supervision, coworkers, salary, working
conditions, and company policies and practices…reduce dissatisfaction” but do not
necessarily improve employee motivation (Bass and Ryterband 41). Employers that
offer stimuli to encourage self-actualization enjoy a more productive workforce because
“satisfaction accrues primarily from a sense of accomplishment in a job that has
personal meaning” (Bass and Ryterband 42).
In Organizational Psychology, Schein echoes Bass and Ryterband’s conclusions
and predicts that managerial awareness of individual needs, combined with proactive
supervisory controls on employee behavior, are essential to increased employee morale
and organizational success (51).

Schein indicates that according to the rational-

economic assumptions managers make regarding employee motivation, employees will
derive the greatest motivation from economic incentives and will behave in a manner
consistent with income maximization (Organizational Psychology 52). The difficulty in
applying this assumption to public servants is readily apparent since civil servants’
wages are regulated and not specifically tied to individual productivity. Schein suggests
managers adopt management approaches that identify and stress Amitai Etzioni’s
concept of calculative involvement to ensure control and minimize employee
dissatisfaction (Organizational Psychology 54). Etzioni’s concept essentially suggests
that individual participation in an organization is based on “a calculation that
participating in the organization serves some individual need” (Rosenbloom 158).
However, as evidenced by the Hawthorne studies, there are numerous social factors that
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also influence employee activity, and calculative involvement stresses employees’
ideological needs rather than their social needs.
The Hawthorne studies demonstrated the importance of social factors and the
extent to which employee production, satisfaction, loyalty, and predictability depend on
the employee’s social relationships within an organization (Rosenbloom 152). The
studies revealed satisfaction of individuals’ social needs necessitates a managerial
approach that imposes authority without sacrificing ideals that are important to
employees.

The Hawthorne studies emphasized the importance of ensuring work

assignments, peer interaction, economic incentives, and other reward systems address
the higher level needs of the employee. Schein correctly argues that awareness of the
rational-economic basis for action combined with a managerial strategy that addresses
social needs allows employee self-actualization.

This approach also encourages

employee development and allows for unthreatening managerial oversight. Application
of such a management strategy is likely to result in reduced levels of employee
dissatisfaction that may lead to security failures based on a return to self-centered goals
inherent in the rational-economic model.
In the intelligence community, potential employees are attracted to the
unmeasurable benefits of the career, but the absence or weakening of subjective
motivators may spell disastrous consequences for the employee who requires the
psychological reinforcement not available otherwise. When the opportunity for selfactualization diminishes, the employee “encounters a work environment that gradually
erodes the initial importance he had placed upon intrinsic task satisfactions and
promotional rewards.

Although the socioemotional rewards of his work context
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remained relatively important, eventually work becomes far less meaningful for him”
(Bass and Ryterband 61-62). Employees who experience this degree of dissatisfaction
are prone to disassociate themselves from the organization and its mission and represent
a significant threat to operational security. Aldrich Ames, for example, concluded “‘the
espionage business…was and is a self-serving sham, carried out by careerist bureaucrats
who have managed to deceive several generations of American policy makers and the
public about both the necessity and value of their work’” (qtd. in Corn 35). Employees
who are most likely to experience this level of dissatisfaction include individuals whose
motivations warrant the designations of “climbers” and “mixed motive employees”
(Thomas 400).
Anthony Downs considers “climbers” those self-interested bureaucrats whose
actions and behavior are motivated “almost entirely by goals that benefit themselves
rather than their bureaus or society as a whole” (qtd. in Thomas 400). Among civil
servants, this trait is most likely to manifest itself after a significant period of
employment has lapsed. Within an intelligence organization, a climber “cannot exist
for long…because the organization’s overwhelming norm is loyalty to something other
than the self” (Thomas 404).

On the one hand, employees who exhibit extreme

resentment towards and dissatisfaction with their organization are most likely to exhibit
climber characteristics, and in most cases should attract the attention of an intelligence
organization’s artifacts (or security detection mechanisms).
Mixed-motive officials, on the other hand, tend to have more complicated
identity issues and may prove more troublesome to identify. Downs holds that mixed
motive employees “combine self-interest and altruistic loyalty to larger values” (qtd. in
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Thomas 400). In the intelligence community, mixed motive officials “are far more
common than purely self-interested individuals because most…careerists have some
degree of altruism” (Thomas 406). Whereas these traits are desirable and perhaps even
prerequisites for those pursuing public service careers, the characteristics may also
create conflicts between the organization’s values and those of the individual. Jonathan
Pollard, for example, eventually concluded the United States’s (and therefore the
ONI’s) value system was not commensurate with the values of his personal ideology.
Because his motives were not those of the careerist and sought little self-serving
purposes, his actions represented a greater threat to operational security because his
espionage activities were less likely to attract the attention of supervisors and security
authorities.
The personal motivation issues that complicate the intelligence community’s
organizational culture are highlighted further by various organizational factors that
contribute to its unique culture.

Weber postulated that secrecy was a necessary

characteristic of any bureaucratic operation because it reinforced the hierarchy of
authority that he believed was central to effective public administration (Rosenbloom
146).

If any of Weber’s scientific management descriptions are applicable to the

intelligence community, the call for secrecy is it. Secrecy requirements are especially
noticeable during the employee selection process, and the most common examples of
the secrecy concept include personnel security principles such as the need-to-know
principle, background investigation, and polygraph examinations (Wettering 270).
The need-to-know principle requires that “employees be given access only to
those secrets that they need to know and no others” (Wettering 274). An extension of
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this principle is compartmentation, or “restricting access to secret information to only
those with a need to know” (Wettering 274). During the applicant screening process, it
is not uncommon for intelligence organizations to advise prospective hires to limit the
extent to which they disclose their career ambitions to anyone who does not need to
know details of the position sought by the applicant. This recommendation serves two
purposes. First, limiting the disclosure of information introduces the applicant to the
industry standard of limiting information to only those persons with a legitimate need to
know. Second, minimizing the disclosure of such seemingly trivial information may
prevent security failures should the applicant actually become a member of the
intelligence apparatus. Simply put, the risk of compromise increases with the rate of
information disclosure.
Another

truly

unique

characteristic

of

the

intelligence

community’s

organizational culture is the necessity of determining applicant suitability through the
use of comprehensive background investigations. Periodic investigations of intelligence
officers and analysts are also routine and generally occur in five-year intervals. As
artifacts of the intelligence culture, such investigative measures, when used effectively,
may provide valuable information on an individual’s suitability for employment and
susceptibility to the influence of other countries’ intelligence services. Unfortunately,
although such investigations are obviously beneficial security precautions, the “number
of people to be screened is beyond the capabilities of the U.S. counterintelligence
establishment” (Wettering 272). In addition to background investigation tools such as
financial reporting (disclosures) and interviews of associates, intelligence organizations’
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pre- and post-employment use of the polygraph examination is another cultural icon that
is unique to the intelligence community.
The polygraph examination is an artifact of particular benefit to the intelligence
community’s counterintelligence corps. Counterintelligence, of course, refers to the
proactive efforts that seek to deter information disclosure to unauthorized recipients,
distort operational details through the use of misinformation, and identify internal
threats to secure operations. Although the reliability of the polygraph examination is
debatable, the tool serves three specific counterintelligence purposes:
First, they intimidate would-be disclosers of secrets from doing so for
fear of being caught. Second, when used on a routine basis they can
reveal deceptions that can lead to confessions, or at least intensive
scrutiny. Third, they can be used as a follow-up investigative tool should
a person come under suspicion from other means. (Wettering 273)
The need-to-know principle, background investigations, and polygraph examinations
are necessary security principles, but collectively they contribute to what many consider
an undesirable culture of secrecy.
Former Senator Dennis DeConcini (D., Arizona) once chaired the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and observed that the CIA, and by extension the intelligence
community, have a “’culture of secrecy’ that induces intelligence people [to] have a
hard time being straightforward” (qtd. in Turner 260). Congressman Dan Glickman,
past chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, also noted
that intelligence agencies tend to “deny that they are doing anything” (qtd. in Turner
260). Glickman also noted that in the intelligence community “[t]here is a cult of
protectiveness, and it runs counter to any external review of their operations” (qtd. in
Turner 260). The legislators’ observations pinpoint one of the many difficulties that
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plague the intelligence community’s organizational culture. Intelligence agencies must
treat employees differently than other bureaucratic institutions and conduct their affairs
behind a veil of secrecy, yet in so doing they run the risk of excessive introversion and
alienation from their peers, policy makers, the public, and the media. These intelligence
community

properties

also

have

significant

post-employment

psychological

ramifications for individuals who pursue careers in intelligence.
Earlier references alluded to promotional opportunities (or the lack thereof)
within the intelligence community as factors that affected interest in intelligence
careers. Upward mobility options also concern veteran careerists, yet the culture of the
intelligence community historically has sent troubling signals about the bases for
promotions. No governmental organization would admit that promotions are based
solely on individual quotas or empirical data. After all, unlike private sector interests,
government service stresses the delivery of services, which are generally not
quantifiable, as opposed to the delivery of goods, which are easily recorded and
analyzed.
In the intelligence community, however, and particularly in the CIA’s
Directorate of Operations, officers with the highest number of agent recruitments
generally have received promotions (Riley 256).

Critics allege that “numbers of

recruitments are what matter…with quality playing second fiddle to quantity” (Riley
265). Furthermore, prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September
11, 2001, many intelligence professionals encountered hierarchy of needs conflicts due
to a lack of mission clarity and purpose that prevent achievement of self-actualization.
Rather than focused, goal-oriented directives, the intelligence complex has had “lots of
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people doing many things on many fronts, rather than a focused few going against top
priority targets…because there are no top priorities, just sundry demands” (Riley 258).
The Ames study will demonstrate the accuracy of these arguments and illustrate the
negative impact of such policies on individuals’ assessments of their peers, supervisors,
and the organization(s) they represent. The discussion will also address how political
pressures affect employee perceptions of agency mission and the importance of the
individual’s contributions to it.
Intelligence agencies exist to assemble and collect information to create
intelligence products that assist policy makers in the formulation and implementation of
United States foreign and domestic policies. The intelligence community therefore has
dual spheres of accountability. Organizations must respond to executive directives
while complying with both executive mandates and congressional oversights. This
accountability to two branches of government automatically politicizes organizations
that should be immune from political pressures and contributes to the post-employment
conflicts some intelligence professionals encounter. On this subject, John A. Gentry
cites the comments of Jennifer Glaudemans, a former analyst in the CIA’s Directorate
of Intelligence. Glaudemans claims that “politicization is like fog” (qtd. in Gentry Ch.
6). She also states that “[t]hough you cannot hold it in your hands, or nail it to a wall, it
does exist, it is real and it does affect people’s behavior” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 6)
Nevertheless, executive and legislative requirements require mandatory specialization
within and across agencies that contributes to individual and cultural conflicts which
impact security failures.
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Intelligence collection and analysis are separate functions that necessitate
divisions of labor reminiscent of Taylorist scientific management principles.

This

functional division is especially noticeable between the CIA’s Directorate of Operations
and Directorate of Intelligence, where the basic intelligence culture is subdivided
further between the directorates. There is a longstanding rivalry between the DI and
DO regarding whether intelligence collection or analysis of the raw product is more
important to policy considerations. The DO views its role as superior to the DI since
the collectors assemble the crucial intelligence that would not otherwise be available to
policy makers. The DI, in turn, routinely views its role as more important since its
integration and analysis functions render the crude intelligence usable to policy makers.
Gentry notes that the culture in the CIA’s DO “contains a streak of
independence and contempt of accountability” (Gentry Ch. 3). He also contends the
DO “jealously guards its information holdings, including those that could be of use to
the analytic community” (Gentry Ch. 3)

Gentry cites former Directors of Central

Intelligence James Woolsey and John Deutch as acknowledging the importance of
cultural change in the DO (Gentry Ch. 3).

Once again, the information sharing

component of the intelligence community’s organizational culture reflects the difficulty
that arises when organizations seek to balance need-to-know requirements
interdepartmentally without jeopardizing the overall intelligence agency mission.
The information sharing variable and the following factors are among the most
significant contributions to intelligence organizations’ unique cultural traits.

As

mentioned previously, employee motivations to pursue careers in intelligence are
diverse and complex. A cultural oddity of the intelligence community is the exhaustive

26

hiring process prospective applicants must complete in order to receive a formal offer of
employment. Applicants must successfully complete various interviews, psychological
assessments, and a battery of investigative reviews to determine suitability for
employment. Employees must complete these processes mindful of the compensation
disparities between government and the private sector. Hitz notes this problem and
argues that to improve the intelligence community “a campaign should first be mounted
to lure the best and the brightest men and women to intelligence work” (19). Hitz also
suggests that “[t]hese top candidates must be paid a premium” (19). Additionally,
employees generally must commit to mobility agreements that subject them to frequent
travel and reassignment based on the best interests of the government.

Although

applicants receive notice of these conditions of employment prior to initiation of the
hiring process, these procedures have few parallels within much less outside
government and reinforce the distinct nature of their career choices. This knowledge
may instill in the employee a sense of invincibility and egoism that complicate
ideological constructs and may lead to disappointment, dissatisfaction, and
disenfranchisement with the intelligence mission.
Earlier reference mentioned the direction and guidance that executive and
legislative branches of government provide to the intelligence community. Whereas
multiple spheres of accountability may create difficulties for intelligence managers, it is
especially vital that intelligence organizations receive detailed direction to retain a sense
of mission and purpose. Referring to the intelligence community, former DCI Richard
Helms commented that “[t]here is no sense of mission” (qtd. in Turner 269). Bass and
Ryterband suggest that “[w]hat holds us to the job, our satisfaction with it, is
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determined by the extent the job is rewarding to us relative to how much better we
might do elsewhere, what aspirations we have and what needs are fulfilled by our
remaining on the job” (68). Riley suggests that the “intelligence requirements being
handed down by policymakers today are many, while vision, direction, and leadership
among those same policymakers is [sic] in short supply” (257). Without adequate
direction, intelligence careerists are more likely to become dissatisfied with their
employment, question the ideological importance of their functions, and seek selfactualization through alternative means. Some of these means represent significant
security threats to intelligence operations.
Within the intelligence community, staff-level employees must believe that their
assessments of peer behavior have significance and may contribute to supervisory
decisions regarding corrective actions and promotion recommendations. If managerial
personnel fail to consider peer reports and suggestions or act in a manner that suggests
supervisors are accountable to a lesser standard than staff employees, they risk
alienating their subordinates and may cause employees to question whether the position
they sought on largely ideological grounds retains the primacy it once offered.
Unfortunately, the intelligence community’s organizational uniqueness only becomes
more complicated when one considers the impact of ethnicity, counterintelligence,
interagency territorial disputes, ideological problems, and legal matters on the
organizations that comprise the intelligence establishment.
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CHAPTER THREE
COMPLICATING FACTORS
The mission of the intelligence community necessitates the recruitment of
personnel from different cultural heritages and academic disciplines.

Intelligence

agencies could not adequately perform what is expected of them if all employees
conform to a single, universal mold. A workforce composed of talented professionals
with various backgrounds, experiences, and educational disciplines ensures an array of
values are represented since analysis of nation- or culture-specific intelligence requires
diverse value systems.

However, the intelligence community also depends on

adherence to basic underlying assumptions that are not always consistent with diverse
individual values. The conflict is obvious.
Rochelle Klein points out that “[i]t may be difficult or impossible to infuse
common values and beliefs in such a diverse workforce” (Klein 323).

She also

indicates that “[e]lements of organizational culture may be incompatible with elements
of ethnic cultures” (Klein 325). Klein contends that “[s]ome members of ethnic cultures
may be unable or unwilling to become part of a particular organizational culture” (325).
In Taylorist fashion, Klein also suggests that when this conflict occurs, “culture cannot
be used as the form of communication and control” (335). She contends that a more
“explicit, bureaucratic form of organization might then be more effective [since]
bureaucracies may not require common values and basic assumptions in order to
perform effectively” (335).

The issue therefore becomes a question of whether

intelligence organizations should abandon attempts to ensure cultural (ethnic) diversity
because of the other cultural (value) risk it poses to security. For the reasons that
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follow, the risks posed by different value systems do not warrant a homogenous
intelligence apparatus.
An ethnically diverse intelligence corps is desirable because the persons with
whom intelligence professionals must establish relations to collect and analyze human
intelligence are themselves from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Ethnicity alone can be a
useful intelligence tool; it is only logical for a recruited agent to feel more comfortable
meeting with and providing information to an officer who shares the source’s ethnicity.
Furthermore, the common ethnical traits increase the believability of explanations for
meetings between officer and agent. Wettering observes that “[m]ost of the more than
50 foreign intelligence services which operate in the United States…practice ethnic
recruiting,” and the United States intelligence community should continue to use this
tool despite claims that it is discriminatory (275).
Maintenance of ethnic diversity is also desirable because it prevents the
amalgamation of values that results in mirror-imaging.

“Mirror-imaging” is the

tendency “to view and interpret a foreign country’s words and actions through one’s
own cultural optic, rather than from the perspective of the foreigners themselves” (Riley
263).

Robert Callum accurately contends that mirror-imaging is “the fundamental

weakness of the IC: with many intelligence professionals cut from the same cultural
cloth, analysts share ‘unacknowledged biases’ that circumscribe both the definition of
problems and the search for solutions” (Callum 26). “The solution,” Callum suggests,
“is to infuse the IC with a competitive heterogeneity of ideas, cultures, and mindsets by
pursuing increased diversity and pluralism among analysts” (26).

The increased

diversity “will lead to improvements in analysis by lessening the impact of shared,
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common biases” (Callum 27).

Callum succinctly captures the importance of an

ethnically diverse when he states that “[d]iversity in the IC is not a legal or ethical
imperative, but rather an analytical one” (30). He correctly argues that “[t]o understand
an increasingly complex world, an increasingly diverse work force is needed” (Callum
30). Despite the risks that divergent value systems may pose to security, “[c]ontinued
reliance on a culturally homogenous pool of analysts will doom the United States to
future ‘intelligence failures’ caused by the projection of ‘our logic’ onto the actions and
tactics of antagonists” (Callum 30).
Finally, the intelligence community must seek ethnic diversity for ethical as well
as operational reasons. Despite the complications that may arise from the presence of
various value systems, intelligence organizations need an ethnically diverse work force
to ensure that agencies do not encounter criticisms such as those encountered by the
Office of Strategic Services and its incredibly homogenous intelligence cadre. Ethnic
diversity should become yet another artifact of the intelligence culture that minimizes
security threats rather than exacerbates them.
Yet another factor that complicates the organizational cultures of intelligence
agencies is the need for and presence of counterintelligence assets. Counterintelligence
(CI) efforts are generally offensive or defensive/technical measures that intelligence
agencies employ to ensure the security of their operations. These measures contribute
to more secure operations, but they also foster an atmosphere of paranoia among the
intelligence community that exacerbates elements of distrust among intelligence
professionals and limits information sharing and reporting of suspicious behavior.
Offensive counterintelligence functions typically include recruitment, double agent
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operations, and defensive measures including “surveillance, personnel and physical
security, investigations, and police work” (Wettering 266). Physical security measures
include the obvious safeguards of passwords, random searches, and password protocols.
As mentioned previously, personnel security includes procedures such as background
investigations and polygraph examinations, but a subsidiary component of personnel
security includes programs that aim to detect employees with substance abuse problems,
income and lifestyle disparities, and spousal issues that might affect employees’
suitability for stewardship of classified information. The case studies that follow will
demonstrate that across the intelligence organization spectrum, the community’s
disregard for these unique artifacts was largely responsible for the intelligence failures
that occurred.
There are also administrative issues that complicate the intelligence
community’s organizational culture and the extent that culture affects security failures.
As demonstrated by the Ames affair, many intelligence professionals question the
efficacy of reporting problematic or suspicious employees whose actions constitute
security threats. Supervisory responses to such complaints have not been productive.
One reason for this lack of confidence in supervisory reactions stems from other
cultural observations. The extant intelligence culture “not only protects its own, it
punishes those who blow the whistle by objecting to lax discipline” (Turner 262). One
intelligence official opined that “[f]ingering colleagues is considered unfair, leading to
the failure…to punish individuals for past counterintelligence failures” (qtd. in Turner
262). An out-of-sight, out-of-mind mentality has been pervasive and resulted in unit
reorganizations, transfers, and promotions of intelligence personnel whose actions are
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not consistent with attributes that intelligence organizations value.

Former CIA

Inspector General Frederick Hitz noted that during his tenure at the agency
“counterintelligence snafus didn’t slow the advance of implicated officials but somehow
served to advance them” (CIA OIG Abstract 17). Hitz noted that a “[s]crew up and
move up” approach to addressing problem employee issues resulted in the promotion of
personnel whose performance warranted discipline rather than praise (CIA OIG
Abstract 17). Gentry echoes Hitz’s observation and notes that one former analyst in the
CIA’s Office of Soviet Analysis observed how frequently supervisors received transfers
and/or promotions:
From April 1986 until August 1987, I had four different branch chiefs
and from April 1985 until August 1987 I had four different division
chiefs and I never changed jobs….When I worked on Soviet policy
toward the United States from January 1988 until I left [CIA] in
November 1989, I also had four different branch chiefs, two division
chiefs and two group chiefs.
It is unlikely that such a promotion pace is attributable to exemplary performance.
Rather, it is more likely that the high degree of turnovers in supervisory positions is at
least partly attributable to transfers or promotions of supervisory employees whose
performance was substandard.
Unfortunately, transfers and promotions of employees who pose risks to security
sometimes occur despite coworkers’ reporting of suspicious or inappropriate behavior.
Management theorist Jay Forrester discusses the importance of employee reporting
mechanisms and supervisory responses to such reports:
If an organization is to deal with problems effectively, they have to be
brought out into the open before they become too serious to manage. For
this to happen, employees must know that managers will respond to the
bad news itself, rather than shoot the messenger. They also have to
know that, although it may not result in management action, all

33

thoughtful dissent will receive a fair and honest hearing. This kind of
open environment is particularly crucial if an organization is to surface
potential ethical dilemmas, which there is great incentive to cover up.
(qtd. in Pekel)
Gentry, however, notes that existing grievance systems in the intelligence community
are inadequate counterintelligence tools. He cites a report issued by the CIA Office of
Inspector General that charges “employees are loathe to use a grievance system to
redress a wrong” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 3). Employee distrust of supervisors and
managerial mishandling of reported security violations leave employees few options
other than submission of complaints to the various Inspectors General assigned to
intelligence agencies. However, most employees are reluctant to utilize this resource as
well.
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is truly an ambitious concept.
Supposedly, the OIG is an independent investigative arm that conducts civil and
criminal investigations of a given agency and exercises additional oversight functions as
well. The OIG is allegedly immune from the influence of agency chiefs and expected to
enforce accountability standards without regard to political influences that might be
brought to bear. Employees are oftentimes reluctant to report suspicious behavior to the
OIG in recognition of the disastrous career consequences such actions may have on the
individual reported should the allegations not be substantiated. Former Deputy Director
for Intelligence Douglas MacEachen notes this hindrance and states that “the Inspector
General will never come back and say you’re absolved” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 3).
MacEachen also claims that the subject of an OIG inquiry “will never be definitely
acquitted” (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 3). He contends OIG personnel “will say we found no
evidence to substantiate it” but will never pronounce innocence (qtd. in Gentry Ch. 3).
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Many employees therefore choose the lesser of two evils and allow managerial
personnel to determine whether the information they provide on suspected
vulnerabilities becomes the basis for more in-depth investigations.
Despite the inadequacy of these internal mechanisms to address security threats,
and although law enforcement agencies have organizational cultures that in many ways
are considerably similar to intelligence agencies, for the reasons that follow,
intelligence professionals are loathe to request the assistance of criminal investigators
and the intelligence assets of law enforcement. As do intelligence organizations, law
enforcement agencies also have vested interests in establishing selective processes for
hiring new personnel. The motivations of those who seek law enforcement careers are
similarly unique to that profession as are the motivations specific to the intelligence
community. Law enforcement personnel have understandable reasons for safeguarding
operational information, and the agencies have probable cause to stress information
disclosure guidelines given the nature of their functions. Law enforcement agencies
and their staffs share significant cultural characteristics with their intelligence brethren,
but the momentous differences in ideology between the organizations also contribute to
significant security weaknesses. Observations of the historic relationship between the
FBI and CIA will illustrate the difficulties mentioned.
Prior to the passage of National Security Act of 1947, the FBI had responsibility
for the collection of all information related to espionage activities directed against the
United States (Turner 263).

In response to the attack on Pearl Harbor, however,

Congress passed the 1947 Act to establish a national clearinghouse of intelligence to
minimize the possibility of recurrent catastrophes. The CIA’s predecessor, the Office of
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Strategic Services (OSS), received responsibility for the collection of foreign
intelligence and the conduct of covert operations outside the United States. Unlike
cultural characteristics, the law enforcement : intelligence dichotomy and the
restrictions that regulate the agencies are statutory.
Title 50 of the United States Code addresses war and national defense concerns.
Section 403-3(d)(1) states that the Director of Central Intelligence (and by extension all
other intelligence agencies) shall “collect intelligence through human sources and by
other appropriate means, except that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, or law
enforcement powers or internal security functions.”

In addition, Executive Order

12333 further delineates what authority the intelligence apparatus enjoys to accomplish
its directives and the point at which intelligence jurisdiction ends and law enforcement
responsibility begins. Executive Order 12333 also states that one of the goals of the
national intelligence effort is as follows:
To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States
law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United
States persons, all agencies and departments should seek to ensure full
and free exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit
from the United States intelligence effort.
Ironically, the cultural traits that the intelligence community shares with law
enforcement agencies create rifts between the two complexes and handicap the
information sharing principles that Executive Order 12333 suggests.

The token

information that the organizations do exchange is frequently insufficient, open-source
material. The information’s lack of intelligence value or delinquency of its delivery
may result in preventable security failures. This unwillingness to share information
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openly is attributable to the ideological differences between law enforcement and
intelligence.
The differences between law enforcement and intelligence “are not only
cultural…but legal, operational, and methodological” (Hulnick 275). One FBI
counterintelligence officer observes that the FBI’s approach differs markedly from that
of the CIA. The official describes the intelligence approach as offensive and believes
that law enforcement strategies tend to be defensive (Turner 265). These differences
have “led to isolation…which engendered…the rise of separate procedures, separate
points of view, and separate cultures” (Turner 265).

Operationally, “intelligence

officers want to exploit their sources and law enforcement personnel want to make
convictions” (Hulnick 276).

Former DCI Robert Gates also acknowledged these

ideological differences and summarized them by declaring that law enforcement “wants
to arrest and prosecute people and put them in jail, and the intelligence folks want to use
information to get more information” (qtd. in Turner 265). For intelligence
professionals, the “recruitment is not a ‘one-time’ deal” in that intelligence officers
expect sources to be long-term producers of information that analysts can integrate to
create predictors and assessments useful to policy makers (Hulnick 276). However, it is
not unusual for law enforcement to recruit confidential informants for one specific
operation. Despite their differing recruitment objectives, however, the law enforcement
community is “just as eager to protect its sources, and is equally reluctant to divulge
information outside the law enforcement community,” much less trust disclosure of the
information to intelligence agencies (Hulnick 276).
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A recent report issued by the National Commission on Terrorism also echoed
this problem. The Commission concluded that the “federal government is stymied by
bureaucratic and cultural obstacles to the quick and broad collection of important
intelligence” (qtd. in Kitfield “Covert” 2861). The Commission also determined that
“law enforcement, defense, and intelligence agencies too often seem more interested in
defending their turf than in coordinating their efforts and sharing sensitive intelligence”
(qtd. in Kitfield “Covert” 2861). Ideological differences between law enforcement and
intelligence are also compounded by legal concerns specific to the organizational
functions of each group.
The law enforcement community’s approach toward recruiting informants and
collecting evidence stems from its mission of obtaining criminal convictions. Whereas
intelligence organizations assemble and analyze investigative information that is not
subject to rules of evidence, law enforcement seeks exculpatory information that can be
introduced in legal proceedings to secure convictions (Hulnick 277).

Convictions

dictate criminal trials, and trials require the production of exculpatory information and
evidentiary procedures that demand adherence to legal rules of discovery.

For these

reasons, law enforcement operations are held to legal and ethical standards not levied on
intelligence agencies whose operations, most of which occur outside the United States,
are not subject to legal restrictions imposed on law enforcement.
The 1948 trial of Judith Coplon further complicated (for the government) the
dichotomy between evidentiary requirements and intelligence sources and methods.
Coplon was convicted on charges of unauthorized disclosure of classified information
after she was caught providing information to a romantic interest who was a KGB
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operative.

Coplon’s legal counsel demanded and received the right to all FBI

information related to the charges against the defendant. Although the FBI turned over
most of the information subject to discovery, Coplon’s conviction was overturned later
partly because the United States refused to deliver information from the VENONA
materials that identified Coplon’s espionage activities (Wettering 290). VENONA is
the code name that refers to the signals intelligence intercepts that allowed the United
States to detect numerous cases of Soviet espionage conducted by Americans during the
1940s and 1950s (Lowenthal 102). The threat that secret information might be obtained
by defense counsel is known as “greymail” and limits prosecutors’ abilities to introduce
classified information as evidence at trail for fear the information might compromise
intelligence (or law enforcement) sources and methodology (Wettering 290).
Under discovery rules, evidence that may be introduced in criminal trials must
be shared with the defendant’s legal counsel, and because “this information must
eventually be revealed to the defense in a trial, protection of sources and methods
becomes impossible” (Hulnick 277). Compromise of sources and methods is anathema
to both law enforcement and intelligence communities, but unlike intelligence
organizations, law enforcement and prosecutors accept such disclosures as necessary to
accomplishment of their missions.
In an attempt to address the problem posed by “greymail,” Congress, in 1980,
passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA).

In compliance with

discovery rules, the CIPA allows ex parte and in camera presentation of classified
information to a judge so the court might determine, outside defense counsel’s presence,
(1) whether the disclosure of classified information is relevant to the legal proceedings
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and (2) whether the release of that information would jeopardize current, former, or
future intelligence or law enforcement operations (Wettering 290). Obviously, defense
counsels must receive relevant information, but operational information that is not
crucial to the prosecution or defense of the defendant is no longer subject to automatic
defense scrutiny. The Department of Justice sought relief under the CIPA as recently as
March 5, 2001, in its request to the court for a protective order to restrict the amount of
classified information the prosecution had to release to Robert P. Hanssen’s attorneys
and further limit defense counsel’s ability to share such information with the defendant
(Frieden).
One of the unique characteristics of government is the difficulty of measuring
the success of administration of public services. Empirical analysis of service delivery
is generally not possible, so most surveys of government performance must measure
subjective factors such as citizen satisfaction with a particular department or program.
Like most other governmental agencies, the law enforcement and intelligence
communities must demonstrate that their accomplishments warrant, at a minimum,
continued funding levels, and, ideally, increased financial support.

Agencies with

intelligence functions therefore legitimize their budgets by measuring the number of
sources recruited, analyses produced, and, to a lesser extent, catastrophes avoided. The
budgetary logic simply assumes that x dollars will achieve y results. It also presumes
that increased funding has a direct correlation with increased recruitments, analyses,
and other intelligence products.

This mentality is problematic in that it suggests

quantity supersedes quality of information and may compel intelligence professionals to
sacrifice ideals and values in favor of meeting recruitment and production quotas. As
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was the case with Aldrich Ames, employees may compromise their own integrity and
jeopardize operational security for the sake of career advancement influenced by
inflated quota systems.
The organizational culture of the intelligence community is a complicated
combination of assumptions, values, and expectations.

Line-level intelligence

employees and their supervisors have difficulty reconciling the cultural attributes with
the demands of the profession. For example, the intelligence culture limits the extent to
which intelligence professionals may discuss their employment with their partners.
Additionally, intelligence employees typically may not publicize intelligence successes,
but they must tolerate public and media criticism of alleged intelligence failures. The
difficulty of this cultural balancing act is lost on the public, for its exposure to the
intelligence community is limited, and its understanding of the intelligence
community’s unique organizational culture is practically nonexistent. Due in part to
this lack of understanding, the public’s perceptions of intelligence operations also
impact (and complicate) the organizational culture of the intelligence community.
As early as 1830, Alexis de Tocqueville noted in Democracy in America that
“democracies are not good at secrecy or perseverance in foreign affairs” (qtd. in
Wettering 291).

His nineteenth century analysis was on target then and remains

accurate today.

Americans by and large are intolerant of secretive governmental

operations. Consider, for example, the public reaction to the Watergate episode of the
1970s. Public outcries for complete disclosure of operational funding, sources, and
methodology are increasingly common.

For operational reasons, full disclosure is

obviously not possible, but part of the problem that nags the intelligence community is
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its inability to broadcast the positive results of its efforts whereas the media readily
reports on alleged intelligence failures and abuses.
Events such as the Iran-Contra affair of the 1980s and the CIA’s recruitment of
sources of information with alleged histories of human rights violations cause the public
to question the ethical standards of intelligence.

Such criticisms have become so

influential that in 1995 DCI George Tenet issued what became known as the “scrub
order,” a directive restricting CIA officers’ abilities to recruit agents with unsavory or
questionable backgrounds (“Regulations”). Following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the CIA clarified the directive and asserted that “those guidelines have been
changed to allow field officers greater latitude in making such decisions” (CIA
“Terrorism”).

Nonetheless, the issuance of the “scrub order” reflects Americans’

inherent distrust of secrets and, to an even greater degree, informers.
When Linda Tripp produced audiocassette recordings of her conversations with
Monica Lewinsky in which the former White House intern acknowledged salacious
details of her relationship with former President Clinton, the public perceived Tripp as a
disloyal tipster with selfish interests. In the public’s eye, Tripp was an untrustworthy
tattler who violated the sanctity of her relationship with Lewinsky (Wettering 291).
Tripp’s revelations labeled her an informer, and the United States public expressed its
disrespect for her actions and motives.

Clearly, intelligence organizations are not

informers because the data collected and analyzed by the intelligence community does
not serve the interests of individual agencies. The intelligence mission serves the
interests of the United States’s national security, but in order to assemble such
intelligence, agencies must associate with persons and groups whose motives and means
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are suspect. It is therefore only natural for the public to infer that intelligence
professionals’ mores are suspect also since members of the intelligence community
sometimes must operate at the same level as the informants who provide intelligence.
This connection simply reinforces the public’s specific distrust of intelligence and
general suspicions of government.
Historically, Americans have been apprehensive of a strong central government.
The Articles of Confederation were intentionally weak because of this fear, and it was
only after addition of the Bill of Rights that some states ratified the United States
Constitution (Wettering 291). By necessity, intelligence organizations conduct most of
their affairs in secret, and many assume secrecy translates to centralized, unchecked
authority with little respect for individual rights and liberties.

Civil libertarians

routinely decry what they consider the intelligence community’s culture of secrecy and
argue that agencies’ claims of the necessity for secrecy are merely obfuscations for the
continued existence of a culture that ensures centrality of authority.
One of the most vocal advocates of openness in government is former United
States Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Moynihan’s chief gravamen is that with the
demise of a bipolar international system, there is no longer a need for the culture of
secrecy that characterized the Cold War. He contends that a “culture of secrecy need
not be the norm in the American government regarding national security” (Moynihan
55). Moynihan believes that “[t]o achieve greater efficiency, laws must be created to
restrain the present culture of secrecy and promote a competing culture of openness”
(55).
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One of the armaments in Moynihan’s arsenal of criticism is the incredible
number of documents classified at the Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret level. Of
particular concern to him is the government’s unwillingness to declassify relics of
bygone eras. Moynihan suggests that “organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt
for classifying as much as possible, and for as long as possible” for both budgetary and
authoritarian concerns (69). Just as lawmakers and senior government officials rely on
recruitment figures and analyses as indicators for fiscal decisions, those in positions of
authority also gauge agencies’ need for funding in part on the number of classified
documents an organization generates. Moynihan points to former President Clinton’s
Executive Order 12958 which, in 1995, resulted in over 374,244 documents receiving
derivative designation as Top Secret for the information they contained. Moynihan’s
concern is legitimate, since excessive classification can impact negatively the agencies
where organizational culture ingrained the initial determination that such classifications
are necessary. Former Senator Moynihan suggests that the “system can become so
constrictive that information is effectively withheld from those who need it” (64)
Unfortunately, a cultural trait that allows the intelligence community to complete its
objectives admirably under most circumstances may, in extreme circumstances,
compete with itself and hinder the establishment’s fulfillment of policy makers’ and the
public’s expectations.
Given the problems associated with such information withholding, one might
wonder whether agencies value budgetary allotments more than mission success. It
would be unfair to make such an accusation since that stance applies a blanket distrust
of intelligence professionals. Nonetheless, in fairness, it is evident that agency pride
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and perceptions of strength and seniority are also complicit in interagency withholdings
of intelligence. “Power in a culture of secrecy frequently derives from withholding
secrets,” Moynihan observes, and he points to the FBI’s unwillingness to share with the
CIA decoded VENONA messages until four years after the FBI received the
information from the military intelligence assets of the United States Army (70).
Despite the historical precedents in favor of increased information sharing and a
revision of the culture of secrecy, Moynihan realistically points out that a “culture of
openness will never develop within government until the present culture of secrecy is
restrained by statute” (65). Such legislation, however, is far from imminent.
The preceding discussion has identified numerous cultural traits that are unique
to organizations directly engaged in the collection and analysis of intelligence as well as
those law enforcement agencies whose missions require adoption of specific cultural
attributes. The cultural characteristics of the intelligence community include elements
of secrecy, distrust and suspicion of peers and outsiders, severe compartmentation of
information, and limited information sharing among community members.

Other

characteristics include employee motivation problems, compensation inequities, and
conflicts that arise between ethnic and cultural diversity. Academicians and social
scientists have recognized the unique nature of these traits, and organizational theory
scholars as well as intelligence veterans have recognized that intelligence organizations
must apply or exhibit these cultural traits in order to produce the product on which
policy makers depend to make informed national security decisions.
Kent Pekel points to Paine’s analysis and confirms that unethical behavior
“involves tacit, if not explicit, cooperation of others and reflects the values, attitudes,
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beliefs, language, and behavioral patterns that define an organization’s operating
culture” (qtd. in Pekel).

Unfortunately, the organizational characteristics of the

intelligence community compel it to be culturally insular and further distance the
establishment from those segments of government and society that need not observe
these cultural peculiarities (Corn 34). This separation contributes to assumptions about
and misunderstandings of the intelligence community that exacerbate the perception of
intelligence agencies as secretive, authoritarian entities that threaten civil liberties.
Applying Schein’s organizational construct, the basic underlying assumptions,
values, and artifacts of the intelligence community are responsible for significant
security and counterintelligence failures. Review of the espionage activities of Jonathan
Pollard, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen, and the cultural environment that allowed
such behavior demonstrates that although their disclosures were unquestionably
devastating to the intelligence community, there are valuable lessons to be learned from
their behaviors and the organizational responses to those actions. It is probable that
intelligence, counterintelligence, and security professionals will not detect all security
compromises, but awareness of the cultural contributions to certain landmark failures
may prevent future security and counterintelligence disasters.
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CHAPTER FOUR
POLLARD CASE STUDY
On November 21, 1985, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation watched
in anticipation and surprise as the green Ford Mustang they had surveilled throughout
the morning entered the driveway of the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C. The
driver and owner of the vehicle was Jonathan Jay Pollard, an intelligence research
specialist who worked for the Office of Naval Intelligence. Also present in the vehicle
was Pollard’s wife, Anne Henderson Pollard. The Pollards were the subject of FBI
surveillance because just days earlier, the FBI and Naval Investigative Service had
begun questioning Pollard about his unauthorized removal, possession, and distribution
of classified national security information. Although Pollard had acknowledged during
earlier interviews that he had inappropriately handled classified documents, agents did
not arrest Pollard immediately since he appeared to be cooperating with their
investigation and claimed to have additional information of relevance to criminal
investigators and counterintelligence staff assigned to the investigation. Nonetheless,
investigators were rightly suspect of the information Pollard had already provided, and
the agents were concerned that if given the opportunity, Pollard would attempt to leave
the United States. Agents were also hopeful that Pollard might lead the investigators to
his handlers or foreign government officials on whose behalf Pollard had allegedly
committed espionage. Their suspicions proved true, for out of fear, desperation, and a
hope for a miracle, Pollard sought refuge and protection at the embassy of Israel, one of
the United States’s most loyal allies and the country on whose behalf Pollard had
committed espionage.
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Most states subscribe to an international legal standard establishing an embassy
and the property on which it is located as the domain of the sovereign nation it
represents. The Israeli embassy, for example, although physically situated in northwest
Washington, D.C., is considered to be an extension of the Israeli State. Therefore, when
Jonathan and Anne Pollard entered the Israeli embassy grounds, the agents surveilling
the Pollards did not enter the Israeli premises because the embassy technically was
considered outside the United States, and law enforcement agents had no authority to
pursue their suspects. However, much to the Pollards’ astonishment, shortly after their
arrival at what they considered a safe haven from United States law enforcement, Israeli
embassy officials demanded the Pollards leave the embassy. The government of Israel
denied the Pollards the safe escape they had been promised, and with nowhere else to
go, the Pollards departed the embassy grounds and were placed under immediate arrest
by the FBI. As the FBI had hoped, Pollard had led agents to the front door of the state
to which Pollard had disclosed significant amounts of classified national security
information. Expecting a heroic reception from those whom he considered his fellow
countrymen, Pollard received only a thankless dismissal.
Later that very Thursday, Jonathan Jay Pollard appeared before the Honorable
Patrick Attridge, a United States Magistrate for the District of Columbia. Pollard
learned that he was charged with violating Title XVIII, Section 794 (a) of the United
States Code, alleging that Pollard, “during November of 1985…with intent and reason
to believe that it was used to the advantage of a foreign nation, did communicate and
deliver to a foreign government directly or indirectly documents, writings, and
information to the national defense” (qtd. in Blitzer 181). If found guilty of this charge,
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Pollard faced a maximum penalty of death, or imprisonment for any term, up to life. At
the arraignment, Attridge also advised Pollard that he also was charged with violating
Title XVIII, Section 793 (e) of the United States Code, “which makes it unlawful to
possess any documents and writings relating to the national defense and willfully retain
the same and fail to deliver them to the officer or employee of the United States entitled
to receive them” (qtd. in Blitzer 181). The maximum penalty for conviction on this
count was a fine of up to $10,000, up to ten years of imprisonment, or both.
Jonathan Jay Pollard was the first of two Pollards to appear before Magistrate
Attridge for arraignment on criminal charges. On Monday, November 25, 1985, Anne
Henderson Pollard also appeared and learned that she, too, was charged with violating
Section 793 (e) of Title XVIII, United States Code, or “unauthorized possession and
transmission of classified documents” (qtd. in Blitzer 187). Anne Pollard also faced
penalties of up to ten years imprisonment or a fine of up to $10,000, or both, if
convicted of this crime.
On June 4, 1986, Jonathan and Anne Pollard returned to the United States
District Court in Washington, D.C. Jonathan Pollard advised Judge Aubrey Robinson,
III, of his intent to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage, or Title XVIII,
United States Code, Section 794 (c). Anne Pollard similarly acknowledged her intent to
plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to receive embezzled government property, in
violation of Title XVIII, United States Code, Section 371. Anne Pollard also agreed to
plead guilty to Sections 793 (e) and 3 of Title XVIII, which is accessory after the fact to
possession of national defense documents (Blitzer 244).
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The Pollards—indeed, most who followed the investigation—expected Anne
Pollard to receive a suspended sentence based on her poor medical condition and plea
agreement with prosecutors. Most watchers also expected Jonathan Pollard would
receive a sentence of imprisonment of up to twenty-five years, a significant but reduced
sentence based on his guilty plea and promise to cooperate fully with investigators.
Government prosecutors had in fact agreed to recommend only a substantial sentence
for Pollard instead of seeking the maximum penalty.

Neither the Pollards nor

courtroom observers expected the sentences Judge Robinson rendered. After having
heard arguments by defense counsel and prosecutors for and against Jonathan and Anne
Henderson Pollard, Judge Robinson pronounced
With respect to the defendant Jonathan Pollard, who is being sentenced
for violation of Title XVIII, United States Code, Section 794 (c), I
commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General or his
authorized representative for his life. With respect to the defendant,
Anne Henderson Pollard, I commit the defendant Anne Henderson
Pollard to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized
representative on the first count of the information to a period of five
years. (qtd. in Blitzer 270–271)
At present, Jonathan Jay Pollard has served approximately 16 years of his life sentence.
Anne Pollard has served her sentence and is no longer in prison. Jonathan Jay Pollard,
however, remains incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Butner, North
Carolina.
The basis for Jonathan Pollard’s arrest for and subsequent admission to
espionage charges began on May 29, 1984. On that date at the Washington Hilton
Hotel in Washington, D.C., Pollard met with an Israeli representative and matter-offactly advised his contact that “he wanted to provide classified documents and
information,” and he “described the position which he held and the nature of the
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classified intelligence information and documents he could provide” (Blitzer 75). Over
the next 20 months, Pollard would provide Israel with significant amounts of classified
United States documents. Subsequent investigations and Pollard’s confessions would
reveal that Pollard “sold to Israel a volume of classified information ten feet by six feet
by six feet” (Blitzer 259). Although he ultimately received compensation in exchange
for his espionage activities, Pollard’s initial motivation to provide Israel with classified
information was not financial. His primary motive was ideological, and the factors that
contributed to the value system that shaped Pollard’s ideology represent one of the
many challenges and difficulties of the intelligence community’s organizational culture.
Other organizational culture principles that contributed to the security failure
represented by Pollard’s espionage include physical and personnel security practices,
information sharing principles, peer reporting norms, and spousal support for illegal
activities.
Earlier discussions of employee motivations revealed that the intelligence
community’s objectives demand a diverse workforce for its information collection
benefits and prevention of mirror-imaging tendencies. The intelligence establishment
must therefore contend with employees whose value systems are far from uniform, and
whose motivations for seeking careers in the intelligence field are equally diverse.
Nonetheless, ethnic diversity is crucial to the United States establishment since such
diversity prevents mirror-imaging tendencies and ensures a variety of viewpoints on
intelligence matters. Among Schein’s descriptions of the levels of culture, this author
argued that cultural values are the greatest threat to the security of the intelligence
establishment. In Pollard’s case, this intelligence research specialist most accurately
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fits the mold of Anthony Downs’s mixed motive classification, and the inherent
conflicts of such a personality run counter to the efficacy of intelligence organizations
(Thomas 404).
Jonathan Pollard grew up in an academic environment. His father, Dr. Morris
Pollard, was a respected microbiologist who served on the faculties of institutions such
as the University of Notre Dame and Cambridge University. Dr. Pollard’s career
entailed periods abroad for the family and ensured Jonathan Pollard’s exposure to
elitism if not idealism through his familial engagement with scholars and academicians.
The Pollard family also instilled in Jonathan Pollard the importance of his Jewish
heritage, but whereas his parents were extremely pro-American, Jonathan Pollard’s
devotion was to Israel first and foremost. “For as long as I can remember,” Pollard
stated in an interview, “Israel has figured prominently in my life as an object of
religious commitment as well as a source of personal strength” (qtd. in Blitzer 19).
Pollard believed it was possible to rationalize illegal behavior through religious and
nationalist justification so long as the rationalized behavior served a greater good than
the wrong represented:
I was brought up with the notion that this kind of service was not
breaking the law but was the discharge, as I say, of a racial obligation.
Certainly, it was made easier by the fact that as far as I was
concerned…there was no difference between being a good American and
a good Zionist. (qtd. in Blitzer 20)
Events in Israel only reinforced the ideologies to which Pollard had been exposed as a
minor.
The 1967 Six-Day War greatly influenced Pollard’s convictions about his duties
to Israel. “That was the turning point for me,” Pollard claimed (qtd. in Blitzer 25). His
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concern over the possible destruction of Israel was complemented by a trip to the
concentration camp at Dachau in 1968, which, he claimed, “gave palpable expression to
the teachings of what could happen when Jews take their existence for granted,”
whereupon he came to believe that “every Jew had a responsibility, an obligation” to
ensure that a catastrophe such as the Holocaust does not happen again (qtd. in Blitzer
27-28). These events collectively established a mixed-motive construct for Pollard, and
his educational pursuits only reinforced what he considered dual loyalties to the United
States and Israel.
After initially pursuing pre-medicine training at Stanford University, Pollard
changed his major to political science. One of Pollard’s former roommates recalled
Pollard’s interests included military history and intelligence operations, and he
described Pollard as “definitely pro-Israel” (qtd. in Blitzer 35).

Other collegiate

associates recalled Pollard claimed to have worked for the Mossad, Israel’s clandestine
intelligence service, and even Pollard’s father noted his son’s fascination with
intelligence.

Pollard’s father observed that Jonathan Pollard was “filled with

romanticism” about a career in intelligence (qtd. in Blitzer 39). Pollard’s commitment
to a career in intelligence merged with his devout ideology in 1973 during the Yom
Kippur War. It was during this event that Pollard “decided the intelligence field would
provide…a skill which would be well received in Israel” (qtd. in Blitzer 40). Pollard’s
commitment to an intelligence profession, however, was blighted by his allegiance to
Israel.

Although Pollard was infatuated with pursuing an intelligence career, his

allegiance to Israel overshadowed his loyalty to his chosen profession. Pollard believed
that “[p]ersonal involvement was…the mark of a responsible individual” (qtd. in Blitzer
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43). Blitzer observes that intelligence operations and the organizations that conducted
them “simply could not satisfy that need” Pollard felt to make proactive contributions to
a cause he considered more important than his professional obligations (Blitzer 43).
After graduation from Stanford, Pollard briefly pursued legal studies at the
University of Notre Dame and graduate work at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University. After his first year at Fletcher, Pollard participated in
an internship at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Pollard personally
observed that “[t]he psychological hallmarks of divided loyalties were certainly there
for all to see: the uneasy conscience, the sense of personal failure” (qtd. in Blitzer 47).
Pollard notes that he was “becoming a weak man with good intentions and doomed by
pride” (qtd. in Blitzer 47). Pollard, however, again rationalized his motivations. He
believed that his commitment to Israel was not inconsistent with the interests of the
United States. “They are not incompatible goals as far as I am concerned,” Pollard
claimed (qtd. in Blitzer 48). Having reconciled these incongruities, Pollard sought
employment with the CIA but did not secure a position because of his drug use during
college. The CIA’s rejection of Pollard marked the beginning of his disenfranchisement
with the intelligence apparatus, and his future employment with Naval Intelligence
would only supplement his dissatisfaction with his chosen profession.
Pollard began his intelligence career as an intelligence research specialist with
the United States Navy in 1979. Pollard immediately encountered what this author
described as a homogenous intelligence structure that necessitated ethnic diversity
among intelligence professionals. “I was totally unprepared for the level and extent of
the anti-Semitism that was tolerated within the organization,” Pollard later noted (qtd. in
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Blitzer 52). His encounter with this cultural manifestation only reinforced his devotion
to Israel and contributed to his voluntary disclosure of national security secrets.
Pollard’s experiences in Naval Intelligence only exaggerated his unhappiness. Anne
Henderson urged her husband to leave the intelligence field, but Pollard remained.
Pollard’s continued involvement in intelligence allowed him to witness the United
States’s guarded information-sharing practices, and “he concluded that the United
States was not providing Israel with enough classified information to enable it to
strengthen its own military capability” (Blitzer 60).
The United States’s reluctance to authorize complete disclosure of intelligence
that might benefit Israel represents a hallmark underlying assumption of the intelligence
community, the need-to-know principle. Pollard stated that he “concluded that those
restrictions were inappropriate for Israel,” and after the 1983 bombing of the United
States Marine barracks in Beirut, he determined to “do something that would guarantee
Israel’s security” (Blitzer 63). Pollard later commented that he realized the illegality of
his actions but allegedly determined “that the ends justified the means’” (Blitzer 63).
Pollard’s election to provide classified information to Israel without authorization based
on individual versus organizational values represents one contribution of organizational
culture to security failures. Another contributory factor, which is oftentimes an offshoot
of motivation and value issues, is the influence of monetary gain on intelligence
professionals.
Prior to providing information to the Israelis, Pollard voluntarily disclosed
classified information to investment associates who, along with their clients, might
benefit economically from the intelligence Pollard shared.
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According to Blitzer,

“Pollard told U.S. investigators that although he was not paid for the information, he
hoped to be rewarded ultimately through business opportunities that these individuals
could arrange for him when he left Naval Intelligence” (70). Pollard’s admission that
he sought financial gain from these disclosures is at odds with his later claims that he
expected no remuneration from Israel for turning over classified documents. Despite
his willingness to provide Israel free access to classified information initially, Pollard
claims Israel forced him to accept compensation for his actions. Pollard stated that his
handlers “would want him to like the extra cash, trips and presents” (Blitzer 79).
Blitzer notes that the Israelis also wished for Pollard “to get used to a more comfortable
lifestyle” (79). One might argue that, comparatively, intelligence careers do not offer
lucrative compensation structures so that only prospective employees who share the
basic underlying assumptions of the culture will pursue a career in the intelligence field.
The rationale for such logic of course is that employees who share said assumptions
pose a lesser risk of compromising security than those employees who do not accept the
cultural assumptions of intelligence. Ironically, the lack of pay parity is actually a
recurrent motivating factor in many espionage cases, including Pollard’s.
Hired in 1979 as an intelligence research specialist, Pollard was, by 1985, quite
accustomed to the improved lifestyle his espionage permitted. He received $2,500
monthly from Israel for his service (Blitzer 96). Apart from Pollard’s ideological
motives, the financial incentive alone was a threat to the public service motives that
most government servants embody. Pollard, too, realized the conflicting nature of his
priorities. At his sentencing, Pollard apologetically stated
Unfortunately, what I failed to remember was that whenever a civil
servant can no longer abide by the political constraints of the
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administration in which he serves or for whom he serves, he really only
has one obligation, both to himself and the nation, and that is to resign in
order to maintain his personal and his civic responsibility. (qtd. in
Blitzer 252)
Pollard’s case not only demonstrates the relevance of cultural assumptions and values,
his actions also capture the importance of cultural artifacts such as physical and
personnel security and peer reporting to the detection and prevention of security
failures.
One of the most controversial artifacts of the intelligence culture is the use of
polygraph technology in pre- and post-employment screening exercises. While the
validity and accuracy of the polygraph as an instrument of truthfulness remains
controversial, most intelligence organizations rely on this artifact to detect and develop
issues that may be material to an individual’s suitability for employment in the
intelligence field. In Pollard’s case, for example, information that surfaced during a
pre-employment polygraph examination disqualified Pollard from employment
consideration at the CIA. Absent that examination, Pollard might have eventually
acquired access to information that was potentially more damaging to the United
States’s security interests than the intelligence he obtained through his ONI
assignments. His handlers also realized the threat that the polygraph posed to their
operation, and “Pollard was told that if he were ever picked up for questioning, he
should always delay for as long as possible any polygraph examinations” (Blitzer 95).
Whereas the CIA and Israelis recognized the value of this tool, Naval
intelligence apparently did not. On January 3, 1985, Pollard completed a periodic
reinvestigation for continued suitability clearance that did not include the use of
polygraph technology that likely would have revealed his espionage activities. Instead,
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Pollard promised to abide by non-disclosure principles and signed a security agreement,
another cultural artifact of the intelligence community. Afterward, his clearance level
allowed access to sensitive compartmented information, or SCI, which is a heightened
Top Secret clearance level for exceptionally classified information (Blitzer 95). The
lack of the polygraph artifact ensured the continuation of Pollard’s unauthorized
collection and distribution of classified information. There were other cultural artifacts
that, although they exist in the intelligence community to detect and deter security
failures, were noticeably ineffective in the Pollard scenario. Of particular notoriety
were physical and personnel security shortcomings as well as inadequate peer reporting
mechanisms.
In 1981, Pollard assisted in establishing communications between the CIA and
South African naval officials. The South Africans provided the CIA with important
information on the location and abilities of various Soviet warships (Blitzer 58). Due in
part to conflicts between the CIA and Naval Investigative Service, Pollard’s role in the
communication channel began to unravel, and questions arose concerning the veracity
of his relationship with the South Africans. Of Pollard, a senior ONI official observed
that “[i]t became obvious the guy [Pollard] had to be unstable” (qtd. in Blitzer 59). The
official also stated that Pollard “wasn’t on anybody else’s wavelength,” which is why
“the system got nervous about him’” (qtd. in Blitzer 59). The only consequence of his
peers’ observations was the temporary suspension of Pollard’s credentials, which the
Navy reinstated after a psychological assessment administered by a friend of Dr. Morris
Pollard concluded Pollard was stable. The Naval Investigative Service pursued no other
investigation action on Pollard’s alleged relationship with South African officials, and
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in June 1984 Pollard received a transfer to the ONI’s Anti-Terrorist Alert Center
(ATAC).
Pollard’s transfer to ATAC was not a reward for exemplary performance.
Blitzer points out that when “a new unit like ATAC is created…they will very often ask
those people who are considered troublemakers or nonproducers to make the switch”
(Blitzer 66). The supervisory process of transferring or promoting problem employees
is an issue that will resurface in the Ames survey, and the transfer of Pollard to ATAC
only increased the number of classified documents to which he would obtain access.
The intelligence community’s personnel security procedures failed, and so would the
supposed physical security measures at ATAC.
Intelligence organizations, especially those with active counterintelligence
components, generally perform at least random searches of employees as they enter and
particularly as they leave work environments where classified information is available.
Employees also traditionally gain entrance to structures that house classified
information only after presentation and verification of proper identification. Naval
Intelligence, however, half-heartedly implemented appropriate security precautions and
enforced no basic counterintelligence security measures. Employees were not subject to
searches, and officers did not monitor whether employees requested access to classified
information that they (the employees) had no need to review based on their intelligence
assignments. After his assignment to ATAC, Pollard “discovered that he could easily
smuggle files out of his office” (Blitzer 71). In fact, at only his second meeting with
Aviem Sella, his initial handler, Pollard delivered forty-eight classified intelligence
publications and photographs that he removed from ATAC without notice (Blitzer 78).
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Pollard would increase gradually the number of documents he smuggled,
undetected, from the ATAC, and ultimately he “delivered literally suitcases full of
classified documents that he had been collecting” (Blitzer 94). Even then-Secretary of
Defense Casper Weinberger, in a pre-sentencing memorandum to the court, noted that
Pollard frequently acted as a courier of classified documents (Blitzer 223). It was not
until Pollard’s ATAC supervisor, Phillip Agee, suspected Pollard might be involved in
espionage that qualified counterintelligence officers became involved in the
investigation (Blitzer 228).

As inadequate as the physical security lapses were,

however, other personnel security shortcomings also contributed to Pollard’s success at
espionage.
Pollard’s January 3, 1985, security review did not include a polygraph
examination, and it apparently lacked a financial analysis component as well. To
increase the scope and effectiveness of periodic reinvestigations, the reviews should at a
minimum include a review of a subject’s credit history and assets. Review of these
items is a basic fixture of personnel security investigations and should always occur in
security investigations. A cursory review of the Pollards’ credit history would have
revealed that between November 1984 and November 1985 the Pollards made payments
in excess of $20,000 to an American Express credit card (Blitzer 103). Transactions in
these amounts would have been obvious alarms to security and counterintelligence
officers and could have prompted an immediate investigation into Pollard’s unexplained
affluence. Finally, Pollard’s reluctance to complete background investigation forms in
September 1985 triggered warning bells to Agee, Pollard’s superior, and the
intelligence specialist’s failure to comply with basic personnel security requirements
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initiated his undoing. Agee’s suspicions and another co-worker’s observation of Pollard
leaving the ATAC with Top Secret documents led to the espionage investigation of
Jonathan Pollard.

Unfortunately, significant damage to the United States national

security had already occurred by the time the Pollard investigation began.
Another reason that Pollard was able to conduct espionage activities undetected
for an extended period of time was the necessity of the intelligence community
performing its functions in a secretive manner and the little-discussed effect this secrecy
has on spousal relations. This issue affects assumptions about the intelligence mission,
and it also has a role in the application of cultural artifacts of an intelligence
organization.

A common underlying assumption is that most assignments contain

classified information and, in accordance with governmental non-disclosure
agreements, technically prohibit employees from discussing their duties with their
spouses (unless, of course, the spouse also has the requisite clearance access and need to
know). Individual values, however, frequently dictate otherwise. That is, it is not
uncommon for intelligence professionals to discuss with their spouses various work
assignments and personal reflections on the value of those assignments.
Pollard, for example, shared with his wife far more than details about official
assignments; he also told her about his espionage plans to benefit Israel. Blitzer notes
that “Anne knew all about his actions from the very start” (Blitzer 85). More troubling
than Pollard’s disclosure to Anne Pollard of his intentions to provide classified
information to unauthorized recipients was his collection of classified documents
related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Pollard turned over to his wife
substantial intelligence data on the PRC to increase the likelihood of her securing a
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public relations contract with Chinese embassy officials (Blitzer 103-04). Both Pollards
remained adamant that Anne Pollard never communicated the contents of these
classified documents to Chinese officials, but she clearly had neither the clearance nor
the need to know such information. As did her husband, Anne Pollard would also
quickly learn to enjoy the fruits of the illicit proceeds her husband received from Israel.
Jonathan Pollard’s liberal information sharing and spousal awareness of unexplained
income are other red flags that a more thorough periodic reinvestigation or
counterintelligence review would have uncovered if conducted properly.
The classified information that Pollard gave and sold to Israel during his career
with Naval Intelligence may have compromised crucial intelligence sources and
methods, and ironically his actions weakened relations between the United States and
Israel. Obviously, his espionage on behalf of Israel also had a disquieting effect on the
United States’s relations with various Middle Eastern states as well.

Despite the

negative consequences of Pollard’s activities on the United States’s intelligence
abilities, there are positive results associated with those compromises.
Predictably, the announcement of Pollard’s arrest on espionage charges
prompted immediate calls for improved counterintelligence investigations of
intelligence personnel. Senator David Durenberger, former chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, issued a statement claiming Pollard’s espionage
“reinforces the need for immediate action on the numerous proposals for improvement
in counterintelligence” (qtd. in Blitzer 185). In purely reactionary fashion, following
the Pollard affair there were also calls from Justice Department officials for stricter FBI
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background checks of persons of Jewish ancestry whose positions necessitated access to
classified information.
Intelligence professionals and supervisory personnel should note that the Pollard
espionage matter spotlighted several areas of concern for intelligence managers,
security officers, and counterintelligence staff. First, ethnic diversity in the intelligence
community is a necessity for the diversity of values it makes available to the
organization. However, managers should be mindful that diverse values may not be
welcome in homogenous work environments, and it is incumbent on supervisors to
balance the need for ethnic and value diversity with monitoring of employees for
behavior not consistent with the intelligence community’s basic underlying
assumptions. Second, intelligence managers, in concert with counterintelligence staff,
must ensure that adequate physical and personnel security measures are in place to deter
if not detect threats to operational security. Such countermeasures include polygraph
applications, heightened physical security precautions, and improved background
investigations of intelligence employees and their spouses. Third, intelligence agencies
should implement better mechanisms for peer and spousal reporting of suspicious
activities by intelligence employees. Intelligence organizations should request greater
flexibility for dealing with internal personnel issues such as poor performance.
Agencies must be able to deal with problem employees without promoting the
individual or merely transferring the person to another area within or without the
organization. Fourth, intelligence leadership must balance the needs of the agencies
with the missions of the organizations and rights of individual employees. Intelligence
managers would do well to realize operational threats are omnipresent, but proper
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internal safeguards can prevent organizational culture principles from contributing to
security failures.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AMES CASE STUDY
On February 21, 1994, Aldrich Hazen Ames departed his suburban residence
outside Washington, D.C., in Arlington, Virginia. Ames’s commute that day was to be
like no other. Shortly after leaving his residence, FBI agents stopped Ames’s vehicle
and arrested him on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage for Russia and its
predecessor state, the former Soviet Union. The arrest of Ames effectively ended one
of the most devastating penetrations of the United States intelligence system by a
foreign power. The magnitude of Ames’s espionage activities and their impact on the
United States’s intelligence sources, methods, and past assessments of Soviet abilities
and weaknesses would not become known until months after his arrest. Investigators
did know by the time of his arrest that Ames provided the Soviets and then Russians
with some of the CIA’s most classified intelligence, and the information he provided
was directly responsible for the death or imprisonment of as many as thirty sources of
the CIA and FBI.
On April 28, 1994, Aldrich Ames and his wife, Rosario Ames, pled guilty to
charges based on their espionage activities. In exchange for their guilty pleas and
promised cooperation with intelligence and law enforcement authorities, Aldrich Ames
received a lifetime prison sentence, and his wife received a sentence of sixty-three
months in prison (Senate Assessment 4). Rosario Ames has completed her sentence,
but Aldrich H. Ames, prisoner number 40087-083, is currently serving his sentence for
life at the Allenwood federal penitentiary near White Deer, Pennsylvania.
At the time of his arrest, Ames had been an employee of the CIA for 31 years,
and he spent practically his entire career in the CIA’s clandestine Directorate of
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Operations (DO). The security classification of information to which he had access was
routinely Top Secret/SCI, and it included the names and identities of United States
agents and double agents abroad and within the United States. Particularly devastating
was the fact that Ames had immediate, unquestioned access to the information most
desired by the Soviets and Russians. Ames provided his handlers with damaging
national security information for almost ten years, and a review of the Ames affair
demonstrates that numerous organizational culture principles specific to the intelligence
community contributed to this unprecedented security failure. The most prominent
organizational factors in the Pollard affair were also problems in the Ames case. In
addition to employee motivation issues and physical and personnel security
requirements, the affair also included an extreme inadequacy of information-sharing
protocols. The depth of Ames’s espionage activities dictate a categorical approach to an
assessment of culture’s impact on the Ames security failure. An overview of his
familial and educational background as well as career progression is also insightful.
Aldrich “Rick” Ames’s introduction to the intelligence community mirrored
Jonathan Pollard’s experiences. Ames’s father, Carleton Ames, held a doctorate degree
and began working for the CIA’s DO in 1952. Carleton Ames and his family completed
an overseas tour in Southeast Asia by 1955, and due in part to his alcohol abuse and
poor performance ratings, Carleton Ames spent the remainder of his career at CIA
headquarters (Senate Assessment 5). Several years later, in 1960, Aldrich Ames would
begin a CIA career that amazingly would mirror his father’s employment journey.
Ames first worked for the CIA as a painter in 1960, and he later found
employment as a clerk typist on a full-time basis. Ames worked for the CIA as a
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document analyst in the DO for the next several years while he pursued a bachelor’s
degree in history at George Washington University. Ames subsequently applied to the
CIA’s Career Trainee Program and entered training for the clandestine service in 1967
(Senate Assessment 6). His first overseas assignment was in Ankara, Turkey, and
supervisory appraisals of his performance “considered him unsuitable for field work
and expressed the view that perhaps he should spend the remainder of his career at CIA
headquarters in Langley” (Senate Assessment 7).
Ames’s next assignment was, in fact, a headquarters rotation, which was
followed by assignments in New York City. Despite numerous security infractions that
should have raised suitability concerns, Ames enjoyed enthusiastically positive
performance appraisals from his supervisors during these assignments and ultimately
received promotion(s) to a GS-14 pay grade. Ames’s successes, however, would be
short-lived, and his next assignment to Mexico City reinforced previous appraisals of
Ames’s inability to function adequately in an overseas recruitment environment. In
fact, “Ames appeared stronger handling established sources rather than developing new
ones” (Senate Assessment 9).

While assigned to Mexico City Ames began an

extramarital affair with Maria de Rosario Casas Dupuy, a paid CIA source, and she
afterwards relocated to join Ames, whose next assignment at CIA headquarters was as
counterintelligence branch chief for Soviet operations in the DO.
Ames’s headquarters assignment was in Soviet counterintelligence, and he also
assisted a field office whose function was source development in the Washington, D.C.,
area. Due to his counterintelligence duties, “Ames was in a position to gain access to
all CIA operations involving Soviet intelligence officers worldwide” (Senate
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Assessment 11). In addition, “[h]is assignment also gave him access to all CIA plans
and operations targeted against the KGB and GRU intelligence services” (Senate
Assessment 11). Ames served in this position until his voluntary transfer to Rome from
1986 to 1989, and once again, Ames’s performance evaluations reflected negatively on
his abilities. Despite poor appraisals and a record of committing flagrant security
violations, Ames returned to the DO’s Soviet Operations Division in 1989 and later was
transferred to the Counterintelligence Center Analysis Group and Counternarcotics
Center where he remained until his arrest in February 1994 (Senate Assessment 42-44).
In each of his assignments Ames exhibited behavior inconsistent with intelligence
organizations’ expectations of its employees.

He routinely violated security rules,

placed himself in compromising situations, and he contradicted the basic assumptions of
intelligence work as well as the values that shape its conduct.
Unlike Jonathan Pollard, whose motivation to commit espionage supposedly did
not include financial gain initially, Aldrich Ames’s only incentive to commit espionage
was the possibility of monetary rewards. Ames’s reasons for disclosing classified
information to unauthorized sources were completely self-serving and fit Downs’s
model of a careerist climber whose personal gain eclipses all other concerns (Thomas
400). Ames recalled that financial difficulties caused him first to consider espionage in
late 1984 or early 1985. Ames had personal debts from his recent divorce settlement, a
car loan, a signature loan, credit card payments, and other expenses associated with
Rosario’s arrival in the United States.

Ames stated that “[i]t was these

pressures…which in April 1985, led him [Ames] to conceive of ‘a scam to get money
from the KGB’” (Senate Assessment 14). Ames’s espionage activities might have been
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prevented, however, had intelligence artifacts such as personnel security measures, peer
reporting mechanisms, and supervisory oversight been more proactive.
Certain behaviors weaken employee credibility and suitability at a minimum and
jeopardize intelligence operations at the other extreme. Ames’s career is replete with
security infractions that should be outright intolerable in the intelligence community.
While assigned to New York, Ames left a briefcase full of classified information on a
subway train, and he also received a citation for not securing various Top Secret
communications equipment. Neither action resulted in any reprimand or corrective
action. He also brought Rosario to a secure apartment in New York provided by the
CIA and occasionally used his personal computer to prepare classified documents (CIA
OIG Abstract 19). Ames also reportedly removed from CIA headquarters plastic bags
containing “five to seven pounds” of classified information (CIA OIG Abstract 20).
While in Mexico, Ames had at least three extramarital affairs that he did not report, and
neither he nor his coworkers reported his involvement with Rosario Dupuy, a foreign
national known to be on the CIA’s payroll (CIA OIG Abstract 20). The DO tendency to
protect its own prevailed. Other peers of Ames stated that Ames “frequently showed
interest in areas unrelated to his immediate area of responsibility” (Senate Assessment
28). However, “none of those colleagues ever made this a matter for the record”
(Senate Assessment 28). In one glaring example of failed peer reporting requirements,
the following information surfaced regarding Ames’s contact with Soviet officials:
One of Ames’s subordinates in Rome told the FBI after Ames’s arrest
that she had suspected Ames was not fully documenting the relationship
between himself and the Soviet official. In fact, she had searched the
office data base to see whether Ames was reporting all of his contacts.
Although she concluded that he was not, she did not notify any senior
manager. (Senate Assessment 29)
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All of Ames’s security violations belied the basic assumptions that form the foundation
of an intelligence organization’s culture, and organizational artifacts that could have
decreased the severity of the Ames affair were noticeably absent.
During his Mexico assignment, Ames also began to abuse alcohol. His problem
drinking resulted in recommendations that he receive treatment for alcohol abuse upon
return to headquarters. Ames “had one counseling session but there was no follow up
program of treatment” (Senate Assessment 10).

Several Agency personnel who

supervised Ames did not report his behavior because “alcohol abuse was not uncommon
in the DO during the mid- to late-1980s,” and other managers pointed to a lack of
support from Langley in dealing with employees who represented problems or threats to
CIA objectives (CIA OIG Abstract 20-21). The DO’s protective posture reinforced this
trend. One report concluded that a DO officer “who has been through training, gone
through the polygraph examination, and had an overseas assignment, is accepted as a
‘member of the club,’ whose fitness for assignments, promotions, and continued service
becomes immune from challenge” (Senate Assessment 70).
Reminiscent of Pollard’s transfer to the ATAC as a managerial means of dealing
with someone whom supervisors considered a problem employee, CIA headquarters
personnel adopted similar procedures to deal with Ames. Ames’s transfer to Rome
from Langley reportedly “was seen as a good way to move a weak performer out of
headquarters” (Senate Assessment 27). Ames’s alcohol abuse was only one of several
personnel security issues that peers and supervisors should have reported for proper
application of artifacts of the intelligence culture.

Ames’s unexplained wealth,

spending habits, foreign travel, and acquisitions, for example, were certainly not in line
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with most other intelligence professionals’ abilities and should have alerted
counterintelligence officers also.
Ames’s supervisors noted that he received frequent counseling for failure to
submit timely reports and financial accountings of operational fund disbursements (CIA
OIG Abstract 18-19). These failures complemented Ames’s existing reputation for
administrative weakness as evidenced by appraisals that noted his “tendency to
procrastinate, particularly in terms of his late submissions of his financial accountings
and operational contact reports” (Senate Assessment 8). Ames’s operational finances,
however, were only a smaller part of a much larger financial problem. His personal
finances were a model case study in the undue affluence counterintelligence officers
should look for when conducting periodic reinvestigations or security inquiries.
Ames received his first payment from the Soviets on May 17, 1985. According
to Ames, the initial $50,000 that he received was to be a “one time deal” (Senate
Assessment 16). It was not a one time deal, however, as Ames received approximately
$2.5 million for the information he sold, and the proceeds he derived from this conduct
allowed considerable purchase power. While receiving an annual salary of less than
$70,000, Ames managed to purchase new Jaguar automobiles and a home—for which
he paid cash—valued at $540,000 (Senate Assessment 2).

Ames explained his

newfound wealth by claiming that Rosario Ames’s wealthy family had provided
financial assistance to the couple. However, more extensive investigations would have
revealed the deception behind Ames’s explanations (CIA OIG Abstract 22-23).
Additionally, proper application of polygraph technology also would have limited the
security compromises Ames committed.
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Prior to departing for Rome in 1986, Ames learned that he would have to
complete a polygraph examination before his European assignment began. Ames later
revealed that he “might not have made the decision to commit espionage in April of
1985 if he had known that he was going to be polygraphed the next year” (Senate
Assessment 26). After Ames’s arrest, the FBI review of Ames’s polygraph results
revealed unresolved questions about Ames’s apparently deceptive responses to
counterintelligence questioning. The FBI determined that had the CIA polygraphers did
not apply the instrument properly and should have developed more detailed questioning
based on Ames’s responses to initial questions (CIA OIG Abstract 26-27). The 1986
examination was not Ames’s only polygraph experience.
In 1991 Ames again underwent a background investigation (including financial
review) and polygraph testing. Although the background investigation and financial
scrutiny raised questions about Ames’s suitability for access to classified information,
the polygraph examiners who conducted the 1991 examination did not receive those
investigative results before they conducted the polygraph tests. The examiners noted
that “having such detailed information available could have significantly altered their
approach to testing Ames” (CIA OIG Abstract 27). Better information sharing could
have improved the quality of the polygraph examination and may have detected Ames’s
activities sooner. This miscommunication is merely a minor snapshot of the problems
inherent in the intelligence community’s guarded information sharing and the effect that
such mutations of the assumption have on operational security.
Former Inspector General Hitz succinctly summarizes the impact of the
information sharing assumption when he argues that “the major failing in the Ames case
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appears to be traceable to non-coordination and non-sharing of derogatory information
concerning Ames” (Hitz 26). In addition, “Hitz elaborated on this by concluding that
the Ames case resulted from ‘ambiguous divisions of responsibility,’ ‘breakdown in
communication,’ and an ‘absence of collaboration and sharing of information’” (qtd. in
Turner 260). Hitz’s reference is to both the CIA’s internal compartmentation structure
that prevented information sharing across divisions, and the Agency’s unwillingness to
share information with its FBI counterparts who have the responsibility for domestic
espionage investigations.
As early as 1986 the CIA had established an investigative group to determine
the reason(s) for various source and operation compromises:
The CIA IG report indicates that the investigation group was hesitant to
solicit financial expertise from other components within CIA, such as the
Office of Financial Management or the IG Audit Staff, and that they
were even more wary of seeking help from any outside sources such as
the FBI. They felt that people outside of the Directorate of Operations
would not have the proper sensitivities to the DO Culture or to the fact
that CIA employees were under scrutiny. (Senate Assessment 53)
Finally, in mid-1991, the joint CIA/FBI investigation of the compromises began as the
Special Investigations Unit (SIU). The group included two CIA counterintelligence
experts, an FBI agent, and an FBI analyst (DOJ OIG Review C). While the CIA
leadership suspected as early as 1986 that a CIA officer might be responsible for the
significant security compromises the Agency suffered, the CIA did not formally advise
the FBI of the specific case details until 1993. In fact, even after the creation of the
SIU, “FBI members of the SIU were given full access to the information that had been
developed concerning Ames…[t]hey had almost no involvement in the investigation of
Ames” (DOJ OIG Review C). The CIA initially dismissed the possibility of an Agency
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penetration being responsible for the compromises, and the intelligence : law
enforcement ideological differences referenced earlier prohibited the free exchange of
information that would have identified Ames as the CIA mole years in advance of 1991
when Ames appeared as one of twenty-nine employees suspected of compromising
Agency operations.
The trend of managerial inattentiveness to substandard performance, undesirable
behavioral patterns, and the security threats associated with these issues are recurrent
themes in the intelligence organization culture. As noted by former Inspector General
Hitz’s report on the Ames affair,
Although information regarding Ames’s professional and personal
failings may not have been available in the aggregate to all of his
managers or in any complete and official record, little effort was made
by those managers who were aware of Ames’s poor performance and
behavioral problems to identify the problems officially and deal with
them. If Agency management had acted more responsibly and
responsively as these problems arose, it is possible that the Ames case
could have been avoided in that he might not have been placed in a
position where he could give away such sensitive source information.
(CIA OIG Abstract 11)
Supervisory assumptions trumped organizational assumptions in the context of the
Ames case. The Agency’s most critical shortcomings were in its system of artifacts, as
they were unable to address the threat posed by a disgruntled employee with a rapidlydeclining value system whose environment lacked adequate operational safeguards.
The CIA’s hesitance to share information with law enforcement represents a mutation
of a core underlying assumption of the intelligence culture and is largely to blame for
the massive security failure.
Despite the obvious negative results of Ames’s espionage activities, one positive
consequence was that the intelligence community and its leadership identified numerous
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areas for improvement and implemented several programs to improve organizational
efficiency and minimize the risk of security breaches.

On May 3, 1994, former

President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 44.

The

counterintelligence directive’s intent was “to foster increased cooperation, coordination
and accountability among all US counterintelligence agencies” (White House “U.S.
Counterintelligence

Effectiveness”).

PDD

44

also

created

the

National

Counterintelligence Center as an information clearinghouse and requires improved
information exchanges between FBI and CIA managers to achieve better law
enforcement : intelligence coordination (White House “U.S. Counterintelligence
Effectiveness”). The directive reinforces the existing requirements for information
sharing originally specified in Executive Order 12333 and a 1988 memorandum of
understanding between the FBI and CIA. To facilitate improved information exchange,
the directive “placed a senior FBI official in charge of counterespionage inside CIA
headquarters” (Kitfield “Anti-terror”). Such a placement and cooperation would not
have occurred prior to Ames’s arrest.
In the aftermath of the Ames case, Justice Department and Agency officials
have cited increased levels of cooperation for the identification and neutralization of
other security threats such as those posed by Harold Nicholson, the former CIA station
chief in Romania. The FBI arrested Nicholson on November 16, 1996, for violating
Title XVIII, section 794, or committing espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage
on behalf of Russia (CIA Joint Press Release). Whereas the Ames affair revealed
startling miscommunications within and outside the CIA about Ames’s polygraph
results and background investigations, in the Nicholson case, “the deception and
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Nicholson’s behavior immediately triggered a counterintelligence investigation, and the
FBI was informed up front about a potential spy case” (Hulnick 280). In a press release
issued by the CIA after Nicholson’s arrest, then-Director of Central Intelligence John
Deutch observed:
The arrest of Nicholson is the direct result of an unprecedented level of
cooperation between the CIA and the FBI. We are now able to
demonstrate quite conclusively that the post-Ames reforms worked as
designed. Clearly the post-Ames analysis and detection mechanisms the
CIA and FBI put in place succeeded in the identification of Nicholson
and his alleged espionage activities on behalf of the Russian intelligence
service. (CIA Joint Press Release)
Commenting on Nicholson’s arrest on espionage charges, former FBI director Louis
Freeh echoed DCI Deutch and stated that the “most formidable weapon against this
grave crime is a close partnership between the FBI and the CIA” (CIA Joint Press
Release).

The leaders’ statements reflect their attempts to reconcile conflicting

ideologies and cultural assumptions applicable to the entire intelligence community.
Improved FBI : CIA cooperation is largely attributable to the efforts of senior
Agency and Bureau officials known as the “Gang of Eight” (Hulnick 282). These
senior leaders have recognized the need to establish firewalls between law enforcement
and intelligence so that communication between them does not jeopardize sources,
methods, or other operational concerns specific to each agency.

The CIA’s lead

representative to the Gang of Eight meetings was then-Deputy Director George Tenet.
Addressing the importance of this group and its efforts, DCI Tenet commented
I think the Ames case was the jumping off point in taking cooperation
between the FBI and CIA seriously, because it proved that we could no
longer tolerate petty bureaucratic jealousy and turf wars in dealing with
threats to American security. And from the very beginning, we
consciously sought to institutionalize the reforms at all working levels so
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that they would become steeped in our culture and not dependent on
transient personalities. (qtd. in Kitfield 2868)
In observance of the necessity to bridge the gaps in intelligence and law
enforcement cooperation without ruffling existing cultural assumptions or ideologies,
Congress passed the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1996. The Act permits the FBI
“to task both the CIA and NSA to gather intelligence against targets related to FBI
cases” (Hulnick 275). This statutory requirement imposes stricter standards on both
intelligence and law enforcement and likely will result in improved threat assessments,
criminal prosecutions, and, optimistically, prevention of grand-scale security failures
and terrorist attacks. The intelligence : law enforcement divide is primarily ideological;
they share numerous cultural assumptions and should strive to prevent exaggerations of
assumptions and employ cultural artifacts in a manner consistent with organizational
requirements for security. Successful applications of these principles resulted in the
arrest of Harold Nicholson, and they were also instrumental in the detection of FBI
special agent Robert Philip Hanssen’s espionage activities and subsequent arrest for
those crimes.
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CHAPTER SIX
HANSSEN CASE STUDY
On February 18, 2001, agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation armed with
a search warrant and an arrest warrant arrived at a park outside Vienna, Virginia.
Agents had previously drafted an affidavit in support of the arrest of an individual
believed to have committed espionage against the United States. The investigators also
had permission to search a single-family residence located at 9414 Talisman Drive,
Vienna, Virginia. FBI agents sought to search the premises and arrest an occupant of
the Vienna residence for violations of Title XVIII United States Code, Sections 794 (a)
and 794 (c). Specifically, the warrant for arrest alleged that its subject had transmitted
national defense information without authorization and conspired to commit espionage
against the United States (FBI Affidavit par. 4). National security investigations and
arrests for criminal conduct associated with such affairs are everyday occurrences for
the FBI since that agency has primary enforcement authority for those alleged crimes.
It is not common, however, for the FBI to arrest one of its own. On February 18,
however, FBI agents arrested special agent Robert Philip Hanssen, a twenty-five year
veteran of the FBI, for committing espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union and Russia
since 1985.
Hanssen’s arrest sent shock waves throughout the law enforcement and
intelligence community. Counterintelligence officials were especially startled by the
revelations that Hanssen, a seasoned FBI agent with extensive experience in
counterintelligence operations, had allegedly been on the Soviet and Russian payrolls
since 1985. Later confirmation of these allegations confirmed that Hanssen had been a
Soviet spy for fifteen of his twenty-five years as an FBI agent, and Hanssen’s defense
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attorney later announced that Hanssen began spying as early as 1979 (“Hanssen”). The
consequences of Hanssen’s actions were devastating to intelligence and law
enforcement agencies whose missions involved the collection, analysis, and
investigation of national security information and suspected compromises thereof. The
enormity of the damage to national security caused by Hanssen’s compromises would
not be known until CIA and FBI personnel debriefed Hanssen following his guilty
pleas.
On June 14, 2001, the Department of Justice submitted for legal consideration a
plea agreement between the United States and Robert Philip Hanssen.

The plea

agreement Hanssen entered into with the government acknowledged Hanssen
committed “13 counts of substantive acts of espionage and one count of attempted
espionage” on behalf of foreign powers, namely the former Soviet Union and Russian
Federation (DOJ “Hanssen”).

The agreement also required Hanssen’s unfettered

cooperation with law enforcement and intelligence officials so they may “assess the full
scope and consequences of Hanssen’s espionage activity, and the damage he has caused
his country” (DOJ “Hanssen”). By pleading guilty, Hanssen avoided a possible death
sentence for his crimes but is ineligible for parole.
Like Pollard and Ames, whose childhood and adolescent exposure to the
intelligence field influenced their career choices, Robert Philip Hanssen’s father was a
veteran lieutenant for the Chicago Police Department in Chicago, Illinois. Hanssen’s
familiarity with the law enforcement community undoubtedly influenced his decision to
pursue a career in law enforcement. Like Pollard and Ames, Hanssen acknowledged an
early interest in intelligence issues. On or about March 14, 2000, Hanssen (also known
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as “B” to his Russian handlers), prepared a letter in which he stated, “I decided on this
course when I was 14 years old” (FBI Affidavit par. 130). For Hanssen, however, the
motivation to commit espionage was not a straightforward financial reason as it was for
Ames. Like Pollard, Hanssen’s motives for his actions were mixed, and the FBI agent’s
education, training, and career progression influenced his values and motivation for
committing espionage. These factors also enabled Hanssen to remain undetected for
fifteen years.
Hanssen received an AB degree in chemistry from Knox College in 1966. After
studying dentistry for approximately two years, Hanssen earned an MBA in accounting
and information systems from Northwestern University in 1971. He became a certified
public accountant (CPA) in 1973 after working for two years as a junior accountant.
Prior to passing the CPA examination Hanssen entered on duty as an investigator with
the Financial Section of the Chicago Police Department’s Inspection Services Division
(FBI Affidavit par. 23-24). In January 1976 Hanssen began his career as a special agent
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a position he retained until his arrest in
February 2001.
Upon completion of his initial FBI training, Hanssen worked on a white-collar
crime squad in Gary, Indiana until 1978. He then transferred to the FBI field office in
New York, New York, and his assignments concentrated on criminal accounting
practices and investigations. Beginning in March 1979, Hanssen assisted with the New
York Field Office’s development of an automated counterintelligence database and
obtained access to information on intelligence officers and other foreign officials
assigned to the United States (FBI Affidavit par. 26-29). From 1981 to 1985 Hanssen
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served as a supervisor in the Intelligence Division of FBI headquarters. He also worked
in the FBI’s Budget Unit and obtained access to detailed information on FBI sources
and counterintelligence activities. Between 1983 and 1985 Hanssen worked in the
Bureau’s Soviet Analytical Unit and Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) Technical
Committee (FBI Affidavit par. 30).

Hanssen enjoyed frequent assignments in

Washington, D.C., and New York, New York, where his duties focused primarily on
Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence operations. He also spent six years as a
senior FBI counterintelligence representative at the Department of State. Hanssen’s
numerous assignments in the Bureau’s intelligence and operations divisions
necessitated ongoing training in counterintelligence tradecraft.

While the specific

training Hanssen received is classified, it is common knowledge that the instruction he
received better prepared him for the rigors of espionage.
By all accounts, Hanssen’s counterintelligence and information systems training
prevented earlier detection of his involvement with the Soviets and Russians. He also
was cautious not to exhibit behavior that might alert his peers, superiors, or
counterintelligence officers to his actions. During the periods where Hanssen spied for
foreign governments and received substantial payments for the information he supplied,
Lawrence Walsh notes that he “displayed no signs of extravagance…maintained his
purist, church-going lifestyle…exhibited exemplary diligence in his professional duties,
ingratiating himself to his superiors” (Walsh n.p.) Pollard and Ames became careless
about their activities, but Hanssen was cautious not to attract attention to himself and
proactively sought to discourage suspicions that he might be a spy. Whereas Pollard
and Ames allowed financial gain to corrupt them, Hanssen’s self-proclaimed motives
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for espionage were not financial.

As former DCI James Woolsey noted, his

“personality and his arrogance had something to do with his decision” to commit
espionage (Woolsey n.p.). Hanssen committed espionage to pacify his ego, and that
motivation creates difficulties for investigators because value-based threats are less
apparent and more complex to detect than other (i.e., financial) incentives to commit
espionage.
Despite Hanssen’s exemplary performance in all of his FBI assignments, he did
not receive appointments to senior positions. Although he was proficient in his duties
and regarded well by supervisors, Walsh notes that Hanssen “was passed over several
times for command positions, instead being placed on desk jobs” (Walsh n.p.). He
notes that Hanssen’s failure to receive promotions made him (Hanssen) feel indignant
(Walsh n.p.).

Walsh also references one commentator who noted that “Hanssen

betrayed his country to feed a more basic need: to pump up his ego” (qtd. in Walsh
n.p.). Former FBI profiler Bill Tafoya observed that “[w]hen we sense that somebody
is not appreciating us, someone is either ignoring or, worse, criticizing us, our selfworth is challenged” (qtd. in Walsh n.p.).
Tafoya also suggests that Hanssen and other “ego-driven insiders are motivated
more by the trophies they collect for themselves than the acknowledgement of others….
As long as he remained one step ahead of internal security, Hanssen could bask in the
self-knowledge that he was better than so-called superiors” (qtd. in Walsh n.p.).
According to Walsh, what made Hanssen more dangerous than others is that he
“cultivated the trust of his superiors…internalized his frustration and directed his skills
and knowledge to a nefarious pursuit” (Walsh n.p.).
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By remaining below the

counterintelligence radar, Hanssen avoided cultural artifacts inherent in the intelligence
community.

His actions also undercut basic assumptions about intelligence by

satisfying his own individual value needs.
One of the flawed basic assumptions in intelligence organizations that Hanssen
leveraged to his advantage is the errant belief that personnel who occupy senior
intelligence positions are immune from the influence(s) of espionage. Individuals with
considerable experience and training are perceived frequently as lesser threats than
agents or field operatives who have routine access to other states’ intelligence
representatives. The high level of trust imparted to senior professionals is necessary in
the intelligence community, but the assumption that employee value systems are always
consistent with the organizations’ values is unrealistic. Consider, for example, the
extent to which Hanssen abused this assumption in furtherance of his crimes.
Hanssen’s placement in senior level FBI positions necessitated access to highly
compartmented information. There was a blanket assumption that, based on his duties
and responsibilities, Hanssen’s need to know classified information was unquestionable.
He routinely accessed the FBI’s computer systems to determine whether he was “the
subject of FBI investigative interest, including checking FBI records to determine
whether there have been recent entries as to his own name, his home address, or the
signal site” Hanssen used to communicate with his handlers (FBI Affidavit par. 5f).
Another impediment to operational security that is traceable to a flaw in the
basic underlying assumptions in the intelligence community is the tendency for
individuals who amass significant experience in a given subject area to be considered
indispensable to a specific function. Persons considered to possess special skills are
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less likely to rotate out of positions where their continued exposure to certain
intelligence increases the risk that the information could be compromised. Frequent
reassignments and rotations of key personnel prevent extensive exposure to classified
information and represent another cultural artifact that, when implemented, may
forestall security failures. Better application of this cultural artifact, in conjunction with
improved polygraph testing, is important to improving operational security.
Unlike the CIA and other intelligence organizations, the FBI has not required
polygraph examinations of agents during periodic background reinvestigations. The
Bureau utilizes the polygraph as a pre-employment screening tool, but its postemployment application has been limited historically to the examination of sources of
information and suspects. The noticeable absence of the polygraph within the FBI as a
deterrent to espionage or any other crime for its agents is a critical cultural shortcoming
that is inconsistent with an assumption that intelligence professionals maintain the
highest degree of integrity and honesty. In the Pollard case and Ames affair, despite
concerns over its accuracy and legitimacy, the possibility of polygraph examination
represented a significant threat to continued espionage activities. Although Ames’s
espionage efforts continued after he underwent polygraph testing, better administration
of the exam and improved information sharing about his results could have revealed his
actions much earlier. The application of polygraph technology in Hanssen’s case could
have minimized the damage he caused also.
Fortunately, once the Bureau determined the existence of a security breach
within its ranks, the FBI’s investigation of Hanssen did not suffer from interagency turf
battles common in task forces formed to investigate serious crimes. Intelligence and
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law enforcement cooperation were much improved in this case than relations had been
during the Ames affair. At the time of Hanssen’s arrest, Louis Freeh was the director of
the FBI.
Freeh said the investigation that led to the charges is a direct result of the
combined and continuing FBI/CIA effort ongoing for many years to
identify additional foreign penetrations of the U.S. intelligence
community. The investigation of Hanssen was conducted by the FBI
with direct assistance from the CIA, Department of State and the Justice
Department, and represents an aggressive and creative effort which led
to this counterintelligence success. (FBI Statement)
There is also no evidence that supervisory complacency contributed to Hanssen’s
continued criminal activity. Hanssen did not receive promotions as a means of dealing
with an agent his supervisors considered eccentric.

Once the investigation into

Hanssen’s espionage began, investigators reconstructed Hanssen’s assignments and
contacts he had in each of his assignments. Despite Hanssen’s attempt to conceal large
monetary payments from his handlers, FBI agents conducted thorough financial reviews
that determined Hanssen received over $1.4 million in cash and diamonds from his
espionage sponsors. Although Hanssen utilized extensive counterintelligence skills to
elude suspicion, it appears from the evidence gathered that FBI agents appropriately
employed various cultural artifacts to reduce the risk Hanssen posed.
The Bureau’s physical security measures such as personal and electronic
surveillance allowed the agency to monitor Hanssen’s travels and communications with
the Soviets and Russians.

The technical security options they exercised included

electronic and other monitoring of Hanssen’s access to automated information that
could have disclosed the Bureau’s suspicions of him. Unfortunately, the Bureau only
instituted such screening tools after it began the Hanssen investigation. The FBI also
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recognized that Hanssen’s counterintelligence experience and access to classified
information were unnecessary risks and modified his responsibilities without alerting
him to the agency’s investigation. The FBI’s application of the aforementioned cultural
artifacts demonstrates succinctly the impact that proper and timely application of the
principles can have on security compromises.
The investigation of Robert Philip Hanssen’s espionage activities and his arrest
for those crimes also indicate that despite their ideological differences, it is possible for
law enforcement agencies with shared cultural assumptions, values, and artifacts to
cooperate and supplement each other’s intelligence and enforcement functions.
Hanssen’s guilty plea is a testament to the success of that improved coordination. The
Hanssen case clearly illustrates the constructive attributes of positive cultural
assumptions such as information sharing principles, and it also highlights the threat that
individual values pose to operational security. The review of Hanssen’s activities also
imparts the importance of cultural artifacts to agencies’ continued ability to identify
those persons and institutions that represent the greatest danger to the United States’s
national security interests. Although the Hanssen study undoubtedly exhibits positive
results of effective organizational culture icons of the intelligence community, there
remains considerable room for improvement to the organizational culture of the United
States intelligence establishment. Intelligence professionals and managers would do
well to give due consideration to the observations that follow.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The organizational culture of the intelligence community is unique from that of
other governmental institutions and notably dissimilar from most private sector
enterprises. Despite some ideological differences between intelligence agencies and
law enforcement organizations, they do share numerous cultural assumptions, values,
and artifacts. The cultural elements that intelligence and law enforcement share are
certainly responsible for many of the security weaknesses and failures that have beset
the intelligence (and to a lesser extent) law enforcement community. The case studies
of Jonathan Pollard, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen demonstrate that these cultural
attributes are present in the defense, intelligence, and law enforcement organizations
that have intelligence collection and analysis functions. This study also concludes that
cultural factors sometimes affect negatively operational security whether the cultural
elements are active (i.e., assumptions) or absent (i.e., artifacts). The forces that threaten
the intelligence culture’s basic underlying assumptions are individual values, and
organizational abilities to address this threat are extraordinarily dependent on the
intelligence community’s artifacts.
How, then, may intelligence organizations protect themselves from the threats
that individual values systems pose to security? Walsh questions, “How do you prevent
another Robert Hanssen from being cultivated by a foreign power?” (Walsh n.p.). He
accurately answers that “[i]n a democratic society, the simple answer is you
can’t….[l]oose controls create a greater probability of exploitation, while extremely
tight security alienates the people you want to trust” (Walsh n.p.). Threats to the United
States intelligence infrastructure are omnipresent. Despite the most efficient application
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of proactive counterintelligence measures, there will always be some degree of
incompatibility between organizational assumptions and the values of those that
comprise the group. What exacerbates this problem in the intelligence community is
the fact that the employee training necessary to conduct intelligence responsibilities also
has the unintended consequence of equipping the potential spy with skills that make
detection of such efforts more difficult. Intelligence professionals and managers can
only ensure that they recognize the risk posed by the nature of their operations and
assets (human as well as non-human). They must also adopt proactive problem-solving
approaches that deter deviation from established value systems, and they must install
countermeasures that detect security weaknesses or failures. This process begins with a
re-examination of the most basic assumptions of the intelligence community.
The reliability of the intelligence community is dependent on the integrity of its
employees. One assumption about the intelligence profession is that those who pursue
it as a career have only the noblest of intentions and will respect the secrecy
requirement that is also assumed applicable at all times. Another accepted necessity is
the need to limit information access through imposition of need-to-know principles and
extensive compartmentation. Information sharing is extremely limited, yet the lack of
adequate communication within and among agencies may also have unintended,
negative consequences.

Related to these processes are understandings that

organizations will employ cultural artifacts in support of these assumptions. It is also
understood that intelligence organizations must conduct some affairs clandestinely in
order to obtain the information necessary for analysis and subsequent use by policy
makers to make national security decisions. Unfortunately, a corollary assumption of
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the intelligence community from without more so than within is that intelligence
organizations disrespect civil liberties, moral standards, and ethical norms in
furtherance of goals that are not necessarily consistent with the idealism that the
organizations represent.

These assumptions about the United States intelligence

community must contend with individual values that challenge their validity.
The intelligence community depends on the diversity of values its employees
represent.

While ethnic diversity issues are not central to the espionage cases of

Pollard, Ames, and Hanssen, the intelligence community would do well to stress ethnic
diversity in its recruitment efforts to prevent mirror-imaging tendencies and improve the
intelligence product the community creates. As Callum points out, ethnic diversity may
present challenges to cultural assumptions, but homogeneity “will only perpetuate the
mistakes of the past and create the failures of the future” (Callum 39). Callum also
notes that “[t]he most fundamental way of improving intelligence is to establish the
heterogeneity” of the intelligence community (Callum 39). Intelligence agencies should
seek ethnic diversity without the use of recruitment quota systems that sacrifice quality
standards in favor of quantity requirements.
Employee motivations lie at the heart of value conflicts with organizational
assumptions. Intelligence agencies should attempt to create environments in which
intelligence professionals may achieve self-actualization through satisfaction of
monetary needs as well as fulfillment of higher level social and ideological
requirements.

Policy makers, in consultation with intelligence leaders and human

resource managers, should ensure compensation parity exists between civil servants and
the private sector. Intelligence executives should also ensure all personnel, especially
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managers, receive more training and instruction in leadership skills. The United States
Commission on Roles of the Intelligence Community argued that “[t]raining should be
treated as a continuous part of career development at all levels and should be used to
inculcate goals and values as well as develop management skills” (United States
Commission). Agencies must also monitor closely employee exposure to classified
information and regularly rotate intelligence staffers to minimize security vulnerabilities
created by extended assignments to sensitive positions.
Intelligence agencies’ stress on the importance of loyalty and integrity as
personal attributes oftentimes prevent employees from reporting the suspicious behavior
of peers. Organizations must encourage employees to report behavior that appears to
dissent from standards expected of intelligence professionals. Intelligence managers
have a corresponding duty to act on those reports and not address the complaint by
recommending the transfer or promotion of potential problem employees. In the most
severe cases, intelligence organizations should have greater flexibility to terminate
employees whose behavior or poor performance increases their vulnerability to
manipulation by other intelligence services. Agencies must also be cautious, however,
to ensure such personnel removals are justifiable, as employee retribution for
unwarranted dismissals may also affect security concerns negatively. Organizations
should also encourage employee reporting to Office of Inspector General (OIG) staff
when concerns over supervisory inattentiveness are material. The OIG, in turn, must
have the authority to report directly to the executive and legislative officials any matters
that the OIG believes are best addressed above the organizational level.
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In recognition of the security risks that individual values represent to
organizational assumptions, intelligence agencies must develop and implement cultural
artifacts to enable appropriate systems of checks and balances that the intelligence
mission demands.

Among the artifacts to be strengthened are thorough periodic

reinvestigations that include detailed financial analyses and interview of coworkers,
peers, spouses, and acquaintances. Intelligence agencies should also improve physical
security mechanisms to include random searches of employees and their work areas and
surveillance of areas where classified information is received and analyzed.
Counterintelligence and information technology experts should also remove from
computer equipment any medium that allows the transfer of information from the
computer to an external device (i.e., diskettes or digital discs, ethernet cards, magnetic
drives, etc.).
Intelligence organizations should also emphasize the use of polygraph
examinations as a counterintelligence tool.

Polygraph examiners should work in

concert with background investigators to ensure that derogatory information obtained in
either process is made available to the other party. In his Senate Judiciary Committee
testimony, former CIA counsel Jeffrey Smith points out that the polygraph remains
“only one tool in an effective counterintelligence program” despite concerns over its
reliability (Smith n.p.). As pointed out by Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman
Richard Shelby, polygraph examinations will not “stop everything such as spying,
espionage, but it will thwart a lot of it” by virtue of its deterrent effects (Shelby n.p.).
In the aftermath of numerous espionage cases, including those of Pollard and
Ames, the executive and legislative branches of the United States government have
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sought to implement proactive approaches to deter, detect, and respond to the threat of
espionage. Their proposal to achieve these objectives is called Counterintelligence 21
or CI21. The initiative “would create a national counterintelligence executive with
independent resources and staff to act as a focal point and conduit between policy
makers, Congress, and private industry on the one hand, and the intelligence, law
enforcement, and defense communities on the other” (Kitfield 2862). The approach
also called for the appointment of a counterintelligence czar to coordinate increased
information exchanges between the intelligence, defense, and law enforcement
establishments. The motives behind the creation of CI21 are laudable, but it is utterly
unrealistic to assume that the addition of another bureaucratic dimension will
miraculously prevent security failures.
To prevent security failures and compromises of secure information as well as
those who collect it and analyze it, the intelligence community must simply be more
cognizant of its own distinct culture. The intelligence mission, the workforce that
pursues its objectives, and the resources those employees must employ to support
national security priorities necessitate and create an organizational culture unlike no
other. Intelligence professionals may only reduce security failures by developing and
implementing cultural artifacts that address the divide between organizational
assumptions and individual values. Recent improvements in these areas have proven it
is possible to balance these elements of the intelligence community’s organizational
culture, but continued vigilance is necessary if the intelligence community wishes to
avoid security compromises such as those achieved by Jonathan Jay Pollard, Aldrich
Hazen Ames, and Robert Philip Hanssen.
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